A Defense of Structural Injunctive Remedies in South African Law by Hirsch, Danielle  E
Hirsch  20/09/2006 
 1
A Defense of Structural Injunctive Remedies in South African Law 
By Danielle Elyce Hirsch1
Abstract: This Article argues that the use of structural injunction remedies by South 
African courts is appropriate, and, in light of demonstrated government inaction, often 
necessary in order to give meaning to the protection of socio-economic rights, which 
is mandated by their Constitution. The Article draws upon numerous United States 
judicial decisions where structural injunctions have been successfully implemented to 
address systemic institutional inaction and violations of the equal protection and due 
process clauses of the United States Constitution. In numerous instances, the South 
African government has not acted to effectively give meaning to the socio-economic 
rights which were broadly declared by the South African Constitution. Because of this 
demonstrated inaction, structural injunctions orders make sense for South Africa 
courts to provide on-going supervision and require compliance with Constitutional 
mandates. Structural injunction orders are one tool that courts should use to help 
ensure that the socio-economic rights intended by the Constitution are realized by all 
South Africans. 
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A Defense of Structural Injunctive Remedies in South African Law 
By Danielle Elyce Hirsch 
 
“Indeed, the greatest benefit of legitimating judicial remedial power may not 
be that it permits the court to act, but rather that it may force the political 
bodies to perform their functions.”2
Judges are more than social critics.  The power of the law and justice lies in 
actions, not just pronouncements.  After finding a constitutional violation by a state 
institution, judges should act upon the belief that simply declaring a practice 
unconstitutional is not the limit of their duty as a judge.  If a state has a function to 
perform and does not perform that function, so that people are injured in their 
constitutional rights, it is the duty of the courts to intervene to protect those rights.  
Given a sworn oath to uphold their constitution, judges are compelled to eliminate any 
practices contrary to it by any means necessary.  In this sense, the exercise of judicial 
remedial discretion is not a good in itself; it is rather the necessary price of upholding 
the constitution.   
This Article will explore the use of the structural interdict/injunction 
(“structural injunction”) remedy for breaches of socio-economic rights violations by 
South African courts drawing on the lessons of numerous United States judicial 
decisions which included structural injunctive relief to address systemic institutional 
violations of the equal protection and due process clauses of the United States 
Constitution.  In light of the demonstrated need for ongoing supervision by the courts 
because of government inaction, employing structural injunctions makes sense 
because, through each of these orders, the state will be ordered to devise and present 
to the court a plan of action to remedy the violation and to report back to the court at 
 
2 William A. Fletcher, “The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial 
Legitimacy,” 91 YALE L.J. 635, 696 (1982) (“The Discretionary Constitution”). 
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regular intervals on its implementation progress.3 To give meaning to South Africa’s 
constitutional protection of socio-economic rights, this Article will argue that 
structural injunction remedies are appropriate and often necessary.   
This Article views socio-economic rights through the lens of remedies.  
Although socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution4 and law are 
discussed, the Article focuses on the institutional structural injunction remedy to give 
meaning to these rights.  Declared rights are often abstract; they are announced 
without a clear sense of how they will be received or implemented.  Through the 
process of remediation and enforcement, however, courts give effect to those rights by 
seeking to reform deficient or recalcitrant state institutions.  Put another way, socio-
economic rights guarantees may well amount to very little if they are not enforced 
strictly and with the necessary institutional mechanisms.  A decision by a court to 
supervise the implementation of its order does not necessarily involve excessive 
interference with the workings of other branches of government, but can be designed 
to foster compliance with what they are constitutionally mandated to do.5
3See, e.g., Mia Swart, “Left out in the cold? Crafting Constitutional Remedies for the Poorest of the 
Poor,” 21 SAJHR 215, 215-19 (2005) (criticizing the relief granted in the Constitutional Court’s socio-
economic jurisprudence because the government has not fully complied with any of the Court’s orders) 
(“Left out in the cold?”); Dennis Davis, “Socio-economic rights in South Africa: The record of the 
Constitutional Court after ten years,” VOL. 5, NO. 5 ESR REVIEW (DEC. 2004) (contending that the 
Constitutional Court’s reluctance to grant structural relief in socio-economic rights violation cases has 
resulted in continued government inertia to take any action to improve the lives of successful litigants); 
Kameshni Pillay, “Implementing Grootboom: Supervision needed,” VOL. 3, NO. 1 ESR REVIEW (JULY 
2002) (arguing that the orders handed down by the Constitutional Court in Grootboom were a 
disappointment because they lacked time frames for action and no court-ordered supervision to ensure 
government compliance). 
 
4 When the South African Constitution is referenced, it is understood to mean the Final Constitution of 
1996, unless otherwise noted. 
 
5 As Bilchitz explains, “[s]uch supervision seems necessary to ensure the effectiveness of socio-
economic rights, any worries about the legitimacy of the Court’ role in this area seems misplaced.  A 
failure to retain a supervisory element in the order rather displays an undue deference by the Court to 
the other branches of government and evinces an unwillingness on its part to retain responsibility for 
the effectiveness of its orders.”  David Bilchitz, “Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum 
Core: Laying the Foundation for Future Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence,” 19 SAJHR 1, 25-26 
(2003) (“Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core”). 
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The most effective means of remedying systemic violations of socio-economic 
rights would be for a court to exercise supervisory jurisdiction in the form of a 
structural injunction order, a power that the Constitutional Court has thus far declined 
to invoke.6 The Constitutional Court has granted only limited forms of structural 
injunctions in prisoners’ voting rights cases, directing steps to be taken to allow 
prisoners to register and vote in elections.7 In contrast, the Constitutional Court has, 
so far, refused to grant structural injunctions over the implementation of socio-
economic rights judgments; instead, providing the state with broad guidelines and 
allowing the state itself to determine how to proceed, without any court-ordered 
monitoring. 8 When court orders themselves are ambiguously worded or fail to 
include any detailed affirmative requirements to provide accountability for the state to 
 
6 The Constitutional Court has come the closest to ordering injunctive relief in Minister of Health v 
Treatment Action Campaign and Others 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (“Treatment Action Campaign”) by 
ordering that the government needed to, without delay, “remove the restrictions” that prevent the use of 
Nevirapine, to “permit and facilitate” its use, and to “take reasonable measures to extend the testing 
and counselling facilities at hospitals and clinics throughout the public health sector to facilitate and 
expedite the use of Nevirapine for the purpose of reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission of 
HIV.” Id. at para 135.  However, the Court declined to monitor the implementation of its order, 
removing any accountability for the government to comply with the Court’s order. 
 
It is perhaps relevant that the order requiring the provision of Nevirapine in all public hospitals would 
not be an expense to the state, “[t]he cost of Nevirapine for preventing mother-to-child transmission is 
not an issue in the present proceedings.  It is admittedly within the resources of the State . . . . 
Therefore this aspect of the claim and the orders made will not attract any significant additional 
costs.” Id. at para 72 (Italics added.). 
 
7 See August v Electoral Commission 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC); Minister of Home Affairs v National 
Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-integration of Offenders (NICRO) 2004 (5) BCLR 455 (CC).  
See also Sibiya and Others v The Director of Public Prosecutions: Johannesburg High Court and 
Others 2005 (8) BCLR 812 (CC) (where the Constitutional Court required the state to furnish a report 
to the Court as to the steps taken, and progress made, as to the process of the replacement of the 
sentence of death for all prisoners on death row with another appropriate sentence in light of the 
Constitutional Court’s previous holding that the execution of the death penalty was inconsistent with 
the Constitution [S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC)]).  
 
8 For example, in Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 
2000 (1) SA 46, the Court extended significant discretion to the state in relation to the state’s 
subsequent implementation of the judgment.  On this issue, Yacoob J stipulated that the state had a 
number of options towards compliance with the Court order, “[t]he precise contours and content of the 
measures to be adopted” are, he argued, “primarily a matter for the legislature and the executive.” Id. at 
para 49.   In addition, “[i]t is essential that a reasonable part of the national housing budget be devoted 
to [giving effect to this Court order], but the precise allocation is for national government to decide in 
the first place.”  Id. at para 66. 
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carry out the orders, there a danger that the state will choose to interpret these orders 
narrowly.  “In considering how best to meet this difficulty, it is, however, important to 
see that the judgments themselves are not the problem.  The problem is, instead, the 
state’s subsequent implementation of them.”9 Thus, if a decree is made only in 
general terms, an uncooperative or unresponsive state defendant may find it easy to 
ignore, disobey or defy the decree without fear of contempt, by making the contention 
that the order is too vague to guide future conduct.  
Despite the reticence of the Constitutional Court to use the structural 
injunction as a tool for reforming the institutions of government to validate socio-
economic rights, many South African high courts have granted structural injunctive 
relief in cases dealing with socio-economic rights.10 This is an encouraging 
 
9 Murray Wesson, “Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-Economic Jurisprudence of the 
South African Constitutional Court,” 20 SAJHR 283, 306 (2004 (“Grootboom and Beyond”). 
 
See also David Bilchitz, “Giving Socio-economic Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core and its 
Importance,” 119 SALJ 484, 502 (2002); Thomas J Bollyky, “R if C > P + B: A Paradigm for Judicial 
Remedies of Socio-Economic Rights Violations,” 18 SAJHR 161, 185 (2002) (illustrating that 
supervisory jurisdiction may result in saving resources in the long run); Jonathan Klaaren, “A Remedial 
Interpretation of the Treatment Action Campaign Decision,”  19 SAJHR 455, 466 (2003) (arguing for 
direct judicial remedies in respect of the minimum core obligation); David Bilchitz, Towards a 
Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core, supra note 5; Marius Pieterse, “Coming to Terms with 
Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights,” 20 SAJHR 383, 414-17 (2004) (suggesting that 
structural injunctive remedies may result in a “dynamic dialogue” between the courts and government 
and that the “pragmatic decision not to exercise supervisory jurisdiction [has] compromised the 
efficacy” of previous court orders); Mia Swart, supra note 3 at 226-28. 
10 See, e.g., City of Cape Town v Rudolph and Others, 2004 (5) 39, 88E-H (CPD) (“City of Cape Town 
v Rudolph”) (“I do not believe that a declaration, standing on its own, will suffice.  There has already 
been such a declaration, made by the Constitutional Court [in Grootboom].  It has not induced the 
applicant [the State] to comply with its constitutional obligations.  Something more is necessary.  The 
circumstances, and in particular, the attitude of denial expressed by applicant in failing to recognise 
the plight of respondents [homeless evicted persons] as also its failure to have headed the order in 
Grootboom makes this an appropriate situation in which an order, which is sometimes referred to as a 
structural interdict, is ‘necessary’, ‘appropriate’ and ‘just and equitable’.” (italics added.) 
 
See also Strydom v Minister of Correctional Services 1999 (3) BCLR 342 (W); Grootboom v 
Oosenberg Municipality 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C) (“Grootboom – High Court”);  Treatment Action 
Campaign and Others v Minister of Health and Others 2002 (4) BCLR 356 (T) (“Treatment Action 
Campaign – High Court”); Rail Commuter Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a/Metrorail (1) 2003 (5) SA 
518 (C); Modderklip Boerdery (EDMS) Bpk v President Van Die RSA En Andre 2003 (6) BCLR 638 
(T), aff’d, Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery; President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA).  
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development for the future enforceability of socio-economic rights.11 Unfortunately, 
when these high court opinions have been reviewed by the Constitutional Court on 
appeal, while the spirit and object of these orders has been affirmed, the actual 
structural injunction orders have been overturned—replaced with aspirational 
declaratory orders for the state to take all appropriate action to provide the applicants 
with their deserved relief.  This Article argues that the high courts should continue to 
exercise supervisory jurisdiction in socio-economic rights cases, just as United States 
district courts successfully did during civil rights’ institutional reform litigation.  
Further, and just as importantly, like the United States Supreme Court did in 
overseeing those same civil rights cases, the Constitutional Court should be willing to 
tolerate, and even encourage, such injunctive relief orders and monitoring to be 
undertaken by high courts to ensure that socio-economic judgments are given their 
full effect.   
This Article is divided into four parts.  Part One traces the socio-economic 
rights provisions in the South African Constitution, as well as the wide-ranging 
remedial powers bestowed upon all levels of South African courts.  Given the 
transformative nature of the socio-economic rights contained in the South African Bill 
of Rights and the broad remedial powers bestowed upon South African courts, this 
Article suggests that when state institutions fail to measure up to what the 
Constitution demands to provide for the realization of socio-economic rights, South 
African courts must employ structural injunctive relief.  Part Two defines the 
structural injunction remedy, drawing from seminal cases in United States’ 
jurisprudence where United States courts exercised supervisory jurisdiction to 
 
11 I wholeheartedly agree with Swart’s optimism that High Court judges are increasingly adventurous 
in their choice of remedy and that, hopefully, the Constitutional Court will soon follow suit in its 
support of High Court structural injunction orders to remedy institutional socio-economic rights 
violations, supra note 3 at 228-35.  
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successfully reform inadequate government institutions.  From this exploration of 
United States case law, several conclusions can be drawn: (1) when a state institution 
defendant exhibits a stubborn resistance to change, extensive court-ordered relief is 
both necessary and proper;12 (2) the converse is also true: if the government chooses 
to cooperate in the institutional suit and provides the court with reasonable plans to 
remedy constitutional violations, the court can declare the parameters of the socio-
economic right while leaving policy discretion up to the government itself.  Part Three 
explores existing South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence on socio-
economic rights, focusing on those socio-economic rights cases in which a high court 
has ordered structural injunctive relief and where the Constitutional Court struck such 
relief down.  Additionally, this section discusses an encouraging recent Transvaal 
High Court judgment, in which the High Court ordered structural injunctive relief to 
enforce government compliance with a Constitutional Court socio-economic rights 
judgment.  Part Four identifies the principal criticisms of structural injunctive relief: 
institutional incapacity in “polycentric” decision-making, deference to the political 
branches of government for policy-making and separation of powers concerns.  This 
Article concludes that unless socio-economic rights provisions in the South African 
Constitution are to be devoid of meaning, South African courts must order state 
institutions to remedy constitutional violations, which may necessitate structural 
injunction orders.  Such remedies ordinarily will have to be more specific than a mere 
prohibition of an illegal activity.  Structural injunctive relief will give definitive effect 
 
12 The state defendant may choose not to cooperate with the court if the reform the remedy seeks to 
bring about is politically unpopular, complicated or expensive. 
 
Also, as Chemerinksy has explained, voluntary government initiatives to advance basic subsistence for 
all citizens will be inherently inadequate because “the self-interest of the majority of citizens is to 
counter the interests of the poor.  People do not want to give up their hard earned money in tax dollars 
to help others.  People are more likely to support programs from which they might benefit.”  Erwin 
Chemerinksy, “Making the Right Case for a Constitutional Right to Minimum Entitlements,” 44 
MERCER L. REV. 525, 539-40 (1993) (outlining seven steps to advance the case for a constitutional right 
to basic subsistence in the United States). 
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to socio-economic rights by seeking to reform inadequate state institutions and 
adequately enforce constitutionally mandated rights.   
I. PART ONE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELEVANT SECTIONS OF THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION, THE MAIN SOURCE OF SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND COURTS’ BROAD POWERS TO REMEDY 
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS.
The South African Constitution codifies a comprehensive range of civil and 
political rights, as well as economic and social rights as directly justiciable rights in 
its Bill of Rights.13 The preamble to the South African Constitution provides, in no 
uncertain terms, that the Constitution was adopted, inter alia, to “heal the divisions of 
the past” and to “improve the quality of life for all citizens.”14 The Constitution thus 
obliges the courts to ensure that socio-economic rights provisions in the Bill of Rights 
are properly enforced and protected.15 The inclusion of these rights, largely 
 
13 See, e.g., Albie Sachs, ‘Towards a Bill of Rights in a Democratic South Africa,” 6 SAJHR 1 (1992); 
Etienne Mureinik, “Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constituiton,” 8 SAJHR 464 
(1992) (“Beyond a Charter of Luxuries”); David Bilchitz, “Towards a Reasonable Approach to the 
Minimum Core,” supra note 5. 
 
14 The full text of the preamble to the South African Constitution reads that the Constitution was 
adopted to: 
“Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights; 
Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which the government is 
based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; 
Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and 
Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a 
sovereign state in the family of nations.” 
 
15 As de Vos argues, the South African Constitution has a transformative vision, especially as to the 
realization of socio-economic rights, and this places significant burdens on the state. 
 “[T]he Constitution explicitly rejects the social and economic status quo and sets as 
one of its primary aims the transformation of society into a more just and equitable 
place where the transformation of society into a more just and equitable place where 
people would better be able to realize their full potential as human beings.  Implicit in 
this transformative vision of their Constitution is the assumption that such a 
document burdens the state with both negative and positive obligations, obligations 
that might sometimes be at variance or, at the very least, might have to be reconciled 
with one another within a specific context.” Pierre de Vos, “Grootboom, the Right of 
Access to Housing and Substantial Equality as Contextual Fairness,” 17 SAJHR 238, 
260-61 (2001) (Footnotes omitted.). 
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influenced by social injustices of the past and the aspiration to establish a society 
based on social justice and fundamental human rights, require that the state meet its 
constitutional obligation to “respect, promote and fulfil” those rights.16 
Numerous socio-economic rights are recognized in the South African 
Constitution.  The entrenchment of economic and social rights, such as rights 
pertaining to housing, health care, food, water, social security and education, that bind 
the state and natural and juristic persons, is a unique feature of South Africa’s Bill of 
Rights.17 
The state’s obligations to some of these rights are expressly qualified.  For 
example, the sections dealing with the rights of access to housing, health care, food, 
water and social security expressly state: “[t]he State must take reasonable legislative 
and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of each of these rights.”18 Moreover, all rights in the South African Bill of 
Rights, be they civil, political, socio-economic or cultural rights, are subject to a 
general limitations clause.19 Any limitation to a right must be made in terms of the 
law of general application and is only permissible “to the extent that the limitation is 
 
16 Section 7(2) of the South African Constitution. 
 
17 To be complete, socio-economic rights can be found in many sections of the Bill of Rights, 
including: labour rights (section 23); the right to an environment that is not harmful to health or well-
being, and to have the environment that secure sustainable development (section 24); equitable access 
to land, security of land tenure and the restitution of property or equitable redress for property that was 
dispossessed after 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws (section 25(5)-(9)); the right of 
adequate housing and a prohibition on the arbitrary eviction of people from their homes or the 
demolition of homes (section 26); the right of access to health care services, sufficient food, water and 
social security (section 27), the right against the refusal of emergency medical treatment (section 
27(3)); the right of children to basic nutrition, shelter, health care services and social services (section 
28(1)(c)); educational rights, and adequate accommodation, nutrition regarding medical treatment at 
the state’s expense for persons deprived of their liberty (section 35(2)(e)). 
 
See also Sandra Liebenberg, “Socio-Economic Rights” in Matthew Chasklason et al (eds) 
CONSTITUITONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA (1999) at 41-29-41-30. 
18 Sections 26(2) and 27(2) of the South African Constitution. 
 
19 Section 36 of the South African Constituiton. 
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reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom.”20 In practice, the initial burden of proving a violation of a 
particular right falls upon the applicant.  If the applicant is successful, the burden 
shifts to the state to show the reasonableness and justifiability of any limitation to that 
right.21 
Even though socio-economic rights are limited by the qualifications that they 
are only accessible to the extent that resources are available and the limitations clause 
analysis, this does not mean that these rights are empty or meaningless.22 The 
foundational values of equality, dignity and human freedom are, in a substantial way, 
linked to socio-economic rights; therefore, a limitations clause analysis can not be 
used to oust meritorious socio-economic rights claims from being heard by the 
courts.23 
20 Id. (supra note 19.)  
 
21 See, e.g., S v Zuma and Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) at para 21; S v Makwayane and Another supra 
note 7 at paras 100-02.   
 
See also, Pierre de Vos, “Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights? Social and Economic 
Rights in South Africa’s 1996 Constitution?” 13 SAJHR 67, 71-74 (1997); Sandra Liebenberg, “Socio-
Economic Rights” supra note 17; Marius Pieterse, “Towards a Useful Role for Section 36 of the 
Constitution in Social Rights Cases? Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local 
Council,” 120 SALJ 41 (2003); Kevin Iles, “Limiting Socio-Economic Rights: Beyond The Internal 
Limitations Clause,” 20 SAJHR 448 (2004).   
 
22 Madala J made this point clearly and elegantly in his concurring opinion in Soobramoney v the 
Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal):
“Some rights in the Constitution are the ideal and something to be strived for.  They amount to a 
promise, in some cases, and an indication of what a democratic society aiming to salvage lost 
dignity, freedom and equality should embark upon.  They are values which the Constitution 
seeks to provide, nurture and protect for the future South Africa.”  Soobramoney v the Minister 
of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at para 42. 
 
23 “There can be no doubt that human dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational values of our 
society, are denied those who have no food, clothing or shelter.” Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para 23. 
 
See also, Nelson Mandela, as quoted by Seth Nthai, “The Implementation of Socio-economic rights in 
South Africa,” JULY 1999 DE REBUS 41, 41 (“The key, therefore, to the protection of any minority is to 
put core civil and political rights, as well as some cultural and economic rights beyond the reach of 
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To this point, so far, this Article has only looked at what provisions in the 
South African Constitution create socio-economic rights.  The propriety of a detailed 
remedy for a violation of a socio-economic right comes from the power of the court 
itself.24 South African courts are empowered, whenever they decide “any issue 
involving the interpretation, protection or enforcement of the Constitution,” to make 
any order that is “just and equitable.”25 The same message is echoed in section 38 of 
the Bill of Rights, providing that, whenever a fundamental right has been violated or 
threatened, a court may grant “any appropriate relief.”26 The South African 
Constitution, then, gives the courts the power to make decisions that could have a 
 
temporary majorities, and to guarantee them as fundamental individual rights.  Thirdly, we must 
address the issue of poverty, want, deprivation and inequality in accordance with international 
standards which recognise the indivisibility of human rights.  A simple vote, without food, shelter and 
health care is to use first generation rights as a smoke-screen to obscure the deep underlying forces 
which dehumanise people.  It is to create an appearance of equality and justice, while by implication 
socio-economic inequality is entrenched.”); Sandra Liebenberg and Karrisha Pillay, SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA, A RESOURCE BOOK (2000) at 16 (“Without the right to food and health care 
services, your right to life as a poor person is threatened; and without the right to an education, it is 
difficult to effectively exercise your civil rights to an education, it is difficult to effectively exercise 
your civil right to express an opinion and to present a petition.”). 
 
24 With remedial powers similar to those in South Africa, the United States Supreme Court has said, 
time and time again, that once a constitutional violation is found, a federal court is required to tailor the 
scope of the remedy to fit the nature and extent of the injury.  See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 
159, 191 (1985) (stating that remedies should be tailored to the injury); United States v. Gouveia, 467 
U.S. 180, 201 (1984) (same); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117 (1983) (same); United States v. 
Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981) (same). 
 
25 Sections 172(1)(b) and 167(7) of the South African Constituiton. 
 
Section 172(1)(b) specifically states that  “[w]hen deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a 
court— 
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to 
the extent of its inconsistency; and  
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including— 
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and 
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any 
conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct for the defect.” (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
26 Section 38 provides, “Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, 
alleging that a right in the Bill of rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant 
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights.  The persons who may approach a court are: 
(a) anyone acting in their own interest; 
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; 
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and 
(e) an association acting in the interests of its members.” (Emphasis added.) 
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major impact on government policies, such as declaring government policies invalid 
or unconstitutional, and then subsequently changing such policies and even 
substituting such policies.  The sweeping powers of South African courts to develop 
and build their own catalogue of remedies are affirmed by number of specific 
constitutional remedies.27 
Similar to its duty to say what the law is, a court has the obligation to 
ensure full compliance with the law.   
“In our context an appropriate remedy must mean an effective remedy, 
for without effective remedies for breach, the values underlying and 
the right entrenched in the Constitution cannot properly be upheld or 
enhanced.  Particularly in a country where so few have the means to 
enforce their rights through the courts, it is essential that on occasions 
when the legal process does establish that an infringement of an 
entrenched right has occurred, it be effectively vindicated.  The courts 
have a particular responsibility in this regard and are obliged to forge 
new tools and shape innovative remedies, if needs be, to achieve this 
goal.”28 
This proposition is hardly revolutionary for courts in a common law legal system, like 
both South Africa and the United States.29 Judges in ordering structural injunctive 
relief have not invented the notion that an intrusive remedy is often necessary to 
ensure adherence to the dictates of the law.  For example, in a family law dispute, a 
judge may restructure the most basic human relationships, with or without the consent 
 
27 These constitutional remedies include: orders of invalidity (section 172(1)(a) of the South African 
Constitution); the development of the common law to give effect to constitutional rights (sections 8(3) 
and 173 of the South African Constitution);  the creation of procedural mechanisms necessary for the 
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights (section 173 of the South African Constitution); and 
procedural remedies derived from some of the substantive rights (for example, sections 32(1), 33(2) 
and 34 of the South African Constitution). 
 
28 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) (Emphasis added.). 
 
29 For example, Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court famously recited that 
“where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy” and that the United States government “has 
emphatically been termed a government of laws, and not of men.  It will certainly cease to deserve this 
high application if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.” Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
 
Cf. Barry Friedman, “When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies,” 65 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 735, 741 (1992) (“When Rights Encounter Reality”). 
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of the parties, pursuant to fairly general standards of equity.30 Courts overseeing 
insolvency disputes—acting through various agents such as receivers and bankruptcy 
trustees—have made decisions about how businesses will be run and have actually 
operated them.31 In some cases, when an enterprise or group has acquired monopoly 
or oligopoly power, under anti-trust law, courts are obliged to undertake direct and 
comprehensive restructuring.32 
The broad authority to grant “appropriate relief” gives South African courts 
the flexibility to adopt creative and new remedies.  As Froneman J articulately 
explained in Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, courts must 
mandate necessary relief, even if the desired remedy is yet untried. 
“In a new constitutional democracy such as ours [granting appropriate 
relief] means that courts have to devise means of protection and 
enforcing fundamental rights that were not recognised under the 
common law.  In so doing the courts have to keep in mind not only that 
the new Executive and administration carries a greater burden than the 
old to provide for these rights, but that they have had to do this in the 
context of unifying separate structures of administration, at least in this 
[Eastern Cape] province, as far as the administration of fundamental 
social rights were concerned.  The courts, in fashioning new remedies 
and in the enforcement of those remedies, must thus take account of 
the practical difficulties experienced by the new administration, and 
must also be extremely wary not to move into areas that, by virtue of 
the constitutional separation of powers, fall outside their domain.  But 
it should be clear that these difficulties may not serve as an excuse for 
failing to fashion and enforce new remedies simply because they did 
not exist under the common law.  In these situations the Judge who 
fails to examine the existing law with a view to ensuring the effective 
realisation of constitutional rights and values that were not recognised 
before is not, as is often presumed by proponents of this course, merely 
neutrally and objectively applying the law.”33 
30 See Theodore Eisenberg and Stephen C. Yeazell, “The Ordinary and Extraordinary in Institutional 
Litigation,” 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 479-86, 488-93 (1980); Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, 
“Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds,” 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1058-59, 
(2004). 
 
31 Id. 
32 Sabel and Simon, “Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds,” supra note 30 at 
1061. 
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Thus, to give full meaning to their remedial powers, South African courts must do 
more than simply declare that the law must accord a remedy—they must direct what it 
means to remedy a right that has been violated. 
II. PART TWO: DEFINING THE STRUCTURAL INJUNCTION REMEDY, NOTING 
ITS APPLICATION IN UNITED STATES’ JURISPRUDENCE OVER THE PAST 60 
YEARS AS AN EFEFCTIVE TOOL FOR REFORMING INADEQUATE STATE 
INSTITUTIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS CONTEXT.
The structural injunction order has long been used as a means of enforcing 
constitutional rights in many common law systems.  Over the past sixty years in 
United States’ jurisprudence, for instance, it has been a powerful tool for reforming 
institutions of government.34 Before discussing the implications of the structural 
injunction remedy on civil rights reform in U.S. case law so as to apply them to the 
South African model, this Article first defines the term “structural injunction” and 
explores how a typical structural injunction order is framed and implemented by a 
court. 
An injunction is an order handed down by a judge who tells a party what she 
must do and must not do.  In particular, a structural injunction is an order that dictates 
how and when government officials must change their behavior and in what ways to 
comply with the constitutional requirements of the state.  Fiss defines the structural 
injunction, as “the formal medium through which the judiciary seeks to reorganize 
ongoing bureaucratic organizations so as to bring them into conformity with the 
 
33 Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 (1) SA 141, 152 at para 16.  
 
34 “In numerous cases, plaintiffs have sued public institutions, seeking not compensation, but sweeping 
and long-term reforms of the institutions themselves.  Many of these cases have been resolved not by 
full trials, but by consent decrees providing for broad policy changes, substantial administrative 
reorganizations or large increases in institutional expenditures.”  Note, “The Modification of Consent 
Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation,” 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1020 (1986). 
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Constitution.”35 In this kind of litigation, the judge undertakes to reform institutions 
by directing officials as to what actions they must take to eradicate unconstitutional 
conditions, and furthermore the judge typically engages in ongoing supervision of 
officials’ compliance efforts. 
Because a positive order in relation to any constitutional right may have far-
reaching policy consequences, it is certainly appropriate for the judiciary to allow 
discretion to the executive and legislature.  However, this does not mean that the 
courts should relinquish all responsibility for the enforcement of constitutionally 
protected rights to the politically accountable branches of government.36 The 
structural injunction order, then, allows courts to put a stop to systemic violations of a 
right and also to prevent its recurrence in the future.37 
A traditional lawsuit pits a plaintiff claiming a wrongful injury of some kind 
against the person who committed the injury; the point of the litigation is to make up 
for the past wrong and the impact of the judgment is limited to the parties.  In 
institutional litigation which results in a structural injunction order, however, the 
lawsuit is undertaken in the interests of communities or classes of people, not only in 
 
35 Owen M. Fiss, “The Allure of Individualism,” 78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 965 (1993). 
 
Fiss has also defined the purpose of a structural injunction order as one “in which a judge, confronting 
a state bureaucracy over values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to restructure the organization 
to eliminate a threat to those values posed by the present institutional arrangements.  The injunction is 
the means by which these reconstructive directives are transmitted.”  Owen M. Fiss, “The Supreme 
Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice,” 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1979) (“The Forms of 
Justice”). 
 
36 See Froneman J in Kate v Minister of Welfare, Eastern Cape, infra note 33.  
 
37 Indian Courts have also used the structural injunction order to determine constitutional institutional 
injuries and impose appropriate remedies.  As Judge Krishna Iyer has observed, “Negative bans 
without supportive schemes can be a remedy aggravating the malady . . . . Judicial engineering towards 
this goal is better social justice than dehumanised adjudication on the vires of legislation.”  Azad 
Rickshaw Pullers Union v Punjab 1981 1 SCR 366, 366. 
 
See also, Bandhua Mutki Morcha v Union of India 1984 2 SCR 67; Rural Land and Entitlement 
Kendra, Dehrandun v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1985 SC 652. 
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the interest of specified individuals, and is brought against state officials to enforce 
asserted constitutional norms.38 The applicants have a particular interest in the 
enforcement of the positive duties of the state to take action towards the protection of 
a constitutional right.39 The structure of an institutional suit tends to be massive, with 
a large number of parties and amici.
If the court does find a constitutional violation, the judge does not merely 
decide legal issues and put an end to the litigation.  Structural injunction orders, 
rather, direct the legislative and executive branches of government to bring about 
reforms defined in terms of their constitutional obligations and the court retains a 
supervisory jurisdiction to ensure the implementation of those reforms.40 
The process of effectuating a structural injunction remedy is many-fold: first, 
the court issues an order which identifies the constitutional violation(s) and defines 
the reform that must be brought about in terms of the objectives to be achieved by the 
ordered reform.  Second, the court calls upon the responsible state actor to present a 
plan of reform which would put an end to the violation by achieving the defined 
 
38 “The principle of legality implies that public bodies must be kept within their powers.  There should, 
in general, be no reason why individual harm should be required in addition to the public interest of he 
general community.  Public law litigation may also differ from traditional litigation between 
individuals in a number of respects.  A wide range of persons may be affected by the case.  The 
emphasis will often not only be backward-looking, in the sense of redressing past wrongs, but also 
forward-looking, to ensure that the future exercise of public power is in accordance with the principle 
of legality.”  Ngxuza and Others v. Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial 
Government and Another 2000 (12) BCLR 1332, 1327(E) (E). 
 
39 See Wim Tremgrove, “Judicial Remedies for Violations of Socio-Economic Rights,” VOL. 1, NO. 4
ESR REVIEW (1999) (“Judicial Remedies”) (arguing that the applicants who would bring an 
institutional lawsuit are “usually poor and politically and socially weak.  They are the ones who are 
dependent on the State for the provision of basic socio-economic services and who lack the political 
and social power to get it without judicial intervention.”). 
 
40 “[T]he trial judge has increasingly become the creator and manager of complex forms of ongoing 
relief, which have widespread effects on persons not before the court and require the judge’s 
continuing involvement in administration and implementation.” Abram Chayes, “The Role of the Judge 
in Public Law Litigation,” 89 HARV. L. REV. 1270, 1281 (1976). 
 
See also, Fletcher, ‘The Discretionary Constitution,” supra note 2 at 638 (“The finding of a 
constitutional violation is “only a prelude to a drawn-out and complex process of devising a decree 
directing the defendants to reform their institution and practices.”). 
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objectives.  This step is significant because it gives the state actor the opportunity to 
suggest the means of its compliance.41 If the state defendant does propose a remedial 
plan, it is presented to the court for its scrutiny.42 Typically, the applicants and all 
other interested parties are given an opportunity to comment on the state’s plan and to 
advance any alternative suggestions.  Next, the court finalizes the plan of institutional 
reform in light of all submissions made to it. 43 In so doing, the court generally defers 
to the state’s choice of means, unless it is irrational, not bona fide or, is in some other 
way, inadequate.44 Finally, the court issues an order directing the state defendant to 
implement the finalized plan and to report back to the court on its implementation 
after the period allowed for execution, or if more appropriate, after prescribed 
deadlines set for the achievement of pre-determined milestones.  If the matter returns 
to court, the state defendant is called to account for its implementation of the plan; all 
other involved parties are also heard.  If the hearing reveals unforeseen difficulties or 
inadequacies in the court-ordered plan, suitable adjustments are made, new orders 
 
41 The state proposed plan will usually have to be tied to a period within which it is to be implemented, 
or a series of deadlines by which identified milestones must be reached.  See Tremgrove, “Judicial 
Remedies,” supra note 39. 
 
42 However, if the responsible state actor does not cooperate in the preparation of a plan, the court has 
no option but to write its own plan with the aid of the other interested parties and any court-appointed 
experts.  This result would force the court to be become increasingly involved in making policy choices 
ordinarily in the legislative and executive domain.  But without preferred state defendant cooperation, 
this judicial involvement will be the only way to ensure the protection and enforcement of 
constitutional rights.   
 
43 As Fletcher notes, a court’s structural injunction order may vary depending on what it seeks to 
accomplish and the means chosen.   
 
“A decree may be extremely detailed.  In a prison or mental hospital case, for instance, it may 
specify precise staffing ratios, the temperatures in rooms or cells, the types and quantities of 
food to be served, the manner of determining types of and times for isolation or solitary 
confinement, and a variety of other things.”  Fletcher, supra note 2 at 639. 
 
44 Tremgrove, “Judicial Remedies,” supra note 39.  
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issued and the process is repeated until all necessary reform is satisfactorily 
achieved.45 
Conventional litigation and remedies are inadequate for socio-economic rights 
violations as monetary damages may be unable to repair the constitutional harm since 
the violation may be too diffuse or nebulous.46 Declaratory orders are likely 
ineffectual because the constitutional violations are often too widespread to stop 
government inaction in a single court order; to have any meaningful effect, the court 
order would have to direct reform at the state institutional itself.47 Even if there was a 
solution to put an end to a systemic violation with a single order, it is often 
inappropriate, or at least less desirable, to adopt the quick-fix solution, rather than 
address reform of the institution systemically.48 These traditional remedies, though 
 
45 See Tremgrove, “Judicial Remedies,” supra note 39; Fletcher, “The Discretionary Constitution,” 
supra note 2 at 638-40; Altman, “Implementing a Civil Rights Injunction: A Case Study of NAACP v. 
Brennan,” 78 COLUM. L. REV. 739 (1978); Colin S. Diver, “The Judge as Political Powerbroker: 
Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions,” 65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979) (“The Judge as 
Political Powerbroker”). 
 
46 For example, several academics have posited that it would be extremely difficult for a court to 
determine how best to compensate victims of unfair racial discrimination in education, if pervasive 
over a long period of time.  See Fletcher, “The Discretionary Constitution,” supra note 2 at 651-52, and 
Tremgrove, “Judicial Remedies,” supra note 39 above. 
 
Cf. Friedman, “When Rights Encounter Reality,” supra note 29 at 747 (“This problem becomes quite 
visible when one considers the victim of a segregated education.  Although reducing this injury to 
money damages would pose some difficulty, the same is true in many tort cases in which the courts 
have been able to reduce injuries to monetary damages.  Nonetheless, in this instance compensatory 
damages against the state [in the United States] are forbidden.  The Court’s remedy, therefore, is a 
prospective order to desegregate, nothing to compensate the high school student who brought the suit.  
The right is violated; there is no remedy.”). 
 
47 For a discussion of relevant authorities on government inertia in South Africa in particular, see infra 
note 3.  
 
48 Many have given the example of overcrowding prisons – technically, an easy one-stop solution to the 
violation would be to release as many prisoners as is necessary to avoid the overcrowding; but this 
seems manifestly improper. See, e.g., Fletcher, “The Discretionary Constitution,” supra note 2 at 650 
(“There is available, however, a much more straightforward response: the court could release on 
habeas corpus all of the prisoners being held under unconstitutional conditions of confinement.  Not 
surprisingly, federal courts in prison reform cases rarely use a massive writ of habeas corpus except as 
a threat, to reform their prisons.”); Tremgrove, “Judicial Remedies,” supra note 39. 
 
Cf. Note, “Courts, Corrections and the Eighth Amendment: Encouraging Prison Reform by Releasing 
Inmates,” 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1060 (1971); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 573 F.2d 98, 100 
(1st Cir. 1978) (“Unless the defendants [prison officials of Suffolk County Jail] meet the terms and 
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extremely useful, do not address the threat of existing and on-going violations of 
constitutional rights by a delinquent state institution in certain contexts.   It follows 
that the structural injunction order is the only possible way to bring about far-reaching 
institutional and structural reform over a period of time, in a manner ideally 
determined by the legislative and executive branches of government.   
As illustrated above, given reasonable and cooperative parties, a court needs to 
initiate few remedial steps of its own when drafting a structural injunction order.  It 
should be emphasized, however, that when confronted with an obstinate defendant, 
more action is required from the court.49 In such instances, a court must affect 
incremental change from the state institution, by successive, more detailed 
supplemental decrees, until full compliance is eventually achieved.50 If a state 
institution exhibits a resistance to change, extensive court-ordered relief is proper and 
required.  Thus, the legitimate basis for a judge to take over the political function in 
 
conditions set forth herein, the Charles St. Jail will be closed on October 2, 1978, to any inmate 
awaiting trial.  Were the jail to close without interim arrangements being made available pending a 
long range solution, the public safety would obviously be threatened.  The community would have been 
badly served by those leaders who, though long ago notified as to what must have been done, resolutely 
refused to take appropriate action.  So that there may be no last minute claims of misunderstanding and 
that the burdens of responsibility be placed squarely where they belong, we state the following: [setting 
forth various terms and conditions].”). 
 
49 For instance, in the first few years after being ordered to desegregate all public schools in Brown v. 
Board of Education II, infra note 51, the practices of many states and local schools were so 
obstructionist in their opposition to carrying out desegregation that they could be classified as 
absolutely defiant, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (where the Supreme Court refused to permit a 
two and a half year delay in desegregating schools in Little Rock, Arkansas); St. Helena School Bd. v. 
Hall, 368 U.S. 515 (1962) (in which  the Supreme Court invalidated a Louisiana statute permitting 
local school boards to close the public schools and rent out the buildings for use as private schools); 
Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (where the Supreme Court held that a district court 
could validly order that the public schools be reopened after the school board closed them to avoid 
integregation).   
See also, discussions about the lack of government cooperation in socio-economic rights cases supra 
note 3. 
 
50 A recalcitrant state agency may also drag its proverbial feet or simply refuse to comply with the court 
order for the implementation of the plan.  Then, the court may hold the responsible state agency in 
contempt of court and impose a fine on it to exact compliance, or, as a last resort, it may hold the 
responsible state officials in contempt of court and fine or imprison them to compel their cooperation.   
See, e.g., Kate v Minister of Welfare, Eastern Cape supra note 33 (holding government officials in 
contempt of court for failing to obey court orders).  
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devising or choosing a remedy in an institutional suit is the demonstrated 
unwillingness or incapacity of the political body to undertake necessary reform.    
First used in the United States in 1955, in Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas (“Brown II”), the Supreme Court has expanded the 
definition of equity power to include the imposition of affirmative obligations upon 
states, and the on-going judicial involvement and supervision of the remedy.51 Since 
then, numerous courts have employed structural injunction remedies in a variety of 
ways to foster public school desegregation,52 to reform state prisons53 and mental 
 
51 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas (“Brown II”), 347 U.S. 483 
(1955).  
 
The Court took up the question of how the federal courts were to desegregate the schools in accordance 
with the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education (“Brown I”), decided the year before. The relevant 
questions asked were: 
“4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by normal 
geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools 
of their choice; or 
(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual 
adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not 
based on color distinctions? 
5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) and (b) are based, and assuming 
further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 
4(b),  
(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases; 
(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach; 
(c) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to frame 
decrees in these cases, and if so what general distinctions should the decrees of this 
Court include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in 
arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decres?” Brown II, 347 U.S. at 298, fn 
2 (quoting Brown I, 347 U.S. 495, 495-96, fn. 13) (Internal quotations omitted.).  
 
To be complete, the Brown v. Board of Education litigation ended in 1999, see Brown v. Unified 
School Dist. No. 501, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Kan. 1999). 
 
52 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, supra note 49; St. Helena Parish School Bd. v. Hall, supra note 49; 
McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963); Griffin v. 
County Schoool Bd., supra note 49; Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Alexander v. 
Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 396 U.S. 1215 (1969); 
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of 
Educ., 372 U.S. F.2d 836, 860 (5th Cir. 1966) (describing challenges posed by 128 school 
desegregation cases filed in district courts in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and 
Texas between 1956 and 1966), adapted in relevant part, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc). 
53 See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F.Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969), 
309 F.Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff’d, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Newman v. Alabama, 349 
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hospitals,54 to address legislative reapportionment55 and other institutional reform of 
housing authorities56 and employment discrimination57. Many government 
institutions throughout the United States have been, or continue to be, subject to the 
supervision of district courts.58 These many institutional reform cases support the 
proposition that in United States’ remedial jurisprudence, “[o]nce a right and a 
violation have been shown, the scope of a court’s equitable powers to remedy past 
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”59 
F.Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff’d, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 948; Taylor 
v. Perini, 413 F.Supp. 189, app. A (N.D. Ohio 1976) (reprinting 1972 order); Battle v. Anderson, 376 
F.Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974), 447 F.Supp. 516 (E.D. Okla. 1977), aff’d, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 
1977);  William v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977) (affirming unpublished district court order); 
Burks v. Teasdale, 603 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1979), 492 F.Supp. 650 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Palmigiano v. 
Garrahay, 443 F.Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977), aff’d, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 839 
(1980); Groseclose v. Dutton, 609 F.Supp. 1432 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), vacated and remanded, 829 F.2d 
581 (6th Cir. 1987); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), rev’d in part, 679 F.2d 1115 
(5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983). 
 
Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (where the Supreme Court reversed an extensive remedial 
order in which the district court judge had required a four-year old federal prison to change a number 
of its practices); Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981) (in which the Supreme Court reversed a 
district court order requiring that only one person be confined to a cell). 
 
Fletcher suggests that Wolfish and Chapman hold that “even if prison conditions are arguably 
unconstitutional, a district court may not move too quickly supplant the normal political control over a 
prison; for the alacrity with which the district courts acted in Wolfish and Chapman stands in marked 
contrast to the district courts’ patience in Hutto.”  Fletcher, “The Discretionary Constitution,” supra 
note 2 at 688. 
 
54 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F.Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F.Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); New York 
State Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F.Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), New York State 
Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F.Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).  
 
Cf. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Holderman, 101 S.Ct. 1531 (1981) (where the Supreme 
Court held the federal statute in question did not confer any substantive rights to ‘minimally adequate 
habitation.’”). 
 
55 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 
56 See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F.Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Adams v. Richardson, 
356 F.Supp. 92 (D.D.C. 1973).  
 
57 See, e.g., Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 374 F.Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 
1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).  
 
58 See, e.g., David Zaring, “National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional 
Reform,” 51 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1015, 1021 (2004) (“National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts”).  
 
59 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (“Swann”).  
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Federal courts are, thus, not only to prohibit the enforcement of unconstitutional laws, 
they are to engage in affirmative reform that will eliminate the continuing effects of 
past constitutional violations. 
Initially, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the primacy of local 
school officials in making the educational decisions necessary to implement Brown 
I.60 This preference for local control proved to be the ground for remanding the 
desegregation cases to the federal district courts, who “because of their proximity to 
local conditions and the possible need for further hearings, could best monitor local 
officials’ compliance with Brown I.”61 This does not mean, however, that state and 
 
It its companion cases, Davis v. School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971), the 
Supreme Court further explained, “[h]aving once found a violation, the district judge or school 
authorities should make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, 
taking into account the practicalities of the situation . . . .  The measure of any desegregation plan is its 
effectiveness.” 
 
Kanner views this passage from Davis v. School Commissioners above to mean that a federal district 
court “should seek to achieve the maximum level of integration that [is] practical.”  Stephen Kanner, 
“From Denver to Dayton: The Development of a Theory of Equal Protection Remedies,” 72 NW. U. L. 
REV. 382, 382 (1977). 
 
60 “School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these 
problems.” Brown II, supra note 51 at 299. 
 
61 Brown II, supra note 51 at 299. 
 
Also, the Supreme Court authorized the lower courts to enter orders, as they saw fit, that could reach all 
levels and details of school administration: 
“[T[he courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the 
physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, 
revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a 
system of determining admission to the public schools on a non-racial basis, and 
revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the 
foregoing problems.”  Brown II, supra note 51 at 300-01. 
 
Despite the granting of these sweeping remedial powers, the Supreme Court predicted that 
desegregation would not come swiftly or easily: “[o]nce such a start [towards desegregation] has been 
made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective 
manner.”  Brown II, supra note 51 at 300 (Italics added.).  
 
Consequently, the Supreme Court permitted the lower courts to implement remedies slowly to take 
account of public resistance or need.  They stated, “ 
Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination 
of such obstacles [to desegregation and integration] in a systematic and effective 
manner.  But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional 
principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.” 
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local state institutions were cooperative in or amenable to these desegregation 
lawsuits.  In many southern states, quite the opposite was true: for more than a decade 
after the Brown decision, school desegregation remained largely a promise unfulfilled, 
obstructed on all fronts by massive resistance.62 Bolstered by the inherent vagueness 
of the Supreme Court’s initial mandates, southern legislatures invoked the historic—
though entirely discredited—doctrines of nullification and interposition, and declared 
the Supreme Court’s orders and decisions null and void.63 Consequently, many 
southern states obdurately ignored Brown and its progeny, and had to be strong-armed 
by district courts into compliance with desegregation schemes.  
As district courts in segregated areas began to apply Brown II, the Supreme 
Court did not impose too many limitations on their discretion, which allowed the local 
district courts to tailor the remedies to fix the constitutional violations directly.64 
Thus, while placing district courts in the position of administering segregation school systems in order 
to achieve desegregation, the Supreme Court also allowed the courts to consider the public interests of 
the segregating states when remedying the harm done to the plaintiffs. See also, Yarbrough, JUDGE 
FRANK JOHNSON AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ALABAMA,, infra note 62 at 151 (“In 1971, the Supreme Court 
approved extensive use of busing to achieve desegregation.  But in 1974, Judge Johnson rejected two 
plans calling for substantial busing of Montgomery schoolchildren, adopting instead a school board 
plan that allowed most students to attend the school nearest their homes and thus, given the city’s strict 
patterns of residential segregation, did not completely eliminate the system’s predominately black 
schools.”). 
 
62 For several examples of Southern resistance to desegregation, please see supra note 49.   
 
Also, for an excellent discussion of Southern racial animus and resistance to civil rights reform and two 
judges’ experiences with structural injunction relief during that time, see both Tinsley E. Yarbrough, 
JUDGE FRANK JOHNSON AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ALABAMA (University of Alabama Press, 1981) at 47-
90;  Frank R. Kemerer, WILLIAM WAYNE JUSTICE: A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY (University of Texas Press: 
Austin, 1991). 
 
63 See, e.g., Yarbrough, JUDGE FRANK JOHNSON AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ALABAMA, supra note 62 at 
91-99 (for a thorough discussion of Governor George Wallace’s extreme resistance to implementing 
Judge Johnson’s public school desegregation order in Montgomery, Alabama). 
 
64 The recognition that the elimination of legal segregation would not itself lead to integrated schools 
did not make its way into a Supreme Court opinion until Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent 
County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (“Green”).  In Green, the county school board adopted a freedom-of-
choice plan that allowed students to choose which of two schools they wished to attend.  In the three 
years the plan had been in operation, some black children had chosen to attend the previously all-white 
school, but no white children had chosen to attend the previously, and still, all-black school.  The 
Supreme Court held that this plan was constitutionally insufficient.  The school board had to be 
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Some academics have posited that the district courts were “abandoned to their own 
devices in determining appropriate methods of compliance” and given little concrete 
direction from the Supreme Court.65 The Supreme Court recognized the 
appropriateness of remedial orders “must rest [only] upon their serving as proper 
means to the end of restoring victims of discriminatory conduct to the position that 
they would have occupied in the absence of that conduct and their eventual restoration 
of ‘state and local authorities to the control of [a state institution] that is operating in 
compliance with the Constitution.’”66 Although their remedial powers are broad, 
there are limits on district court discretion, however.67 
required to formulate a new plan that would “promise realistically to convert promptly to a system 
without a ‘white’ school and a ‘Negro’ school, but just schools.”  Id. at 442. 
 
Then, in Swann, supra note 59, the Supreme Court articulated the rule that “the nature of the violation 
determines the scope of the remedy.”  Id.  In so doing, the Supreme Court affirmed a district court 
decree in which school attendance boundaries were redrawn and students were reassigned among 
schools to eliminate one-race schools and to achieve some degree of racial ‘balance’ in the school 
system and busing was ordered to achieve these objectives.  Thus, the Supreme Court upheld an order 
that students be bused across town to integrate the schools in spite of segregated housing patterns. 
 
The Supreme Court expanded upon the holding in Swann by stating that “the principle that the nature 
and scope of the remedy are to be determined by the violation means simply that federal-court decrees 
must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation itself.”  Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 
267, 281-82 (1977).  In Milliken v. Bradley, the Supreme Court upheld a district court order that a 
school district needed to establish a remedial education program. 
 
65 See, e.g., Read and McGough describe the Supreme Court’s role in desegregation institutional suits 
as largely unhelpful, in the following: 
Throughout the desegregation battles from 1955 to 1970, the Supreme Court of the 
United States has been content with prodding its lower courts towards more rapid 
compliance with its mandates.  Even its decisions in Green, Alexander and Carter,
the Supreme Court issued terse ‘do it now’ commands [;] ot did not provide ‘how to 
do it’ instructions.  Lacking firm directives from the Supreme Court on how to 
accomplish desegregation, the lower federal courts—with the bulk of the activity 
centering in the [United States’ Court of Appeals for the] Fifth Circuit—were 
abandoned to their own devices in determining appropriate methods of compliance . . 
. . From pupil placement acts to freedom-of-choice to neighborhood zoning to 
majority-to-minority transfer options to clustering and pairing of schools to busing, 
the federal courts of the South had struggled with the ‘how’ of integration while the 
Supreme Court had been content with ‘hurry-ups.’” Frank Read and Lucy McGough, 
LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH (1978) at 
523.  
 
66 Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. 2038, 2049 (1995) (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. at 489)).  
 
67 In Missouri v. Jenkins, supra note 66 above, for example, the Supreme Court was sceptical of a 
decree ordering higher teacher salaries and other improvements in public schools.  The district court’s 
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Federal courts have employed structural injunctions not just to foster school 
desegregation, but also in many other institutional contexts, applying the same 
preference for localized district court ordered relief.68 Unlike desegregation 
jurisprudence just discussed, in the penal, mental health center and juvenile detention 
facility institutional litigation arena, district court judgments themselves set the 
standard for constitutional violations.  For example, after eight years of pre-trial 
activity and 159 days of trial,69 District Judge William Wayne Justice held in Ruiz v. 
Estelle that the Texas Department of Corrections (“TDC”) management of prisons 
constituted “cruel and unusual punishment,” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. 
“The trial of this action lasted longer than any prison case—and 
perhaps any civil rights case—in the history of American 
jurisprudence.  In marked contrast to prison cases in other states, the 
defendant prison officials here refused to concede that any aspect of 
their operations were unconstitutional, and vigorously contested the 
allegations of the inmate class on every issue.  However, the evidence 
and the applicable law have demonstrated that the constitutional 
infirmities pervade the TDC prison system.   
 
This memorandum opinion has, at some length, cited and summarized 
the evidence indicating the existence of these constitutional violations.  
 
rationale was that by making the schools more attractive, they would attract more white students.  The 
Supreme Court held that, without greater justification than was given, the salary order was “simply too 
far removed from an acceptable implementation of a permissible means to remedy previous illegally 
mandated segregation.”  Id.  
Also, once the school system has been desegregated, despite whatever other beneficial improvements 
could be made, judicial supervision should cease.  See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell (1991).  Similar 
issues arise regarding the end of supervisory jurisdiction over prison reform litigation , see, e.g., John 
C. Jefferies, Jr., Pamela Karlan, Peter W. Low and George A. Rutherglen, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS:
ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION (Westbury, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 2000) at 846-52. 
 
68 For examples of some of these cases, supra notes 53, 54, 55 and 56. 
 
See also, Zaring , “National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts,” supra note 58 at 1018-19 (“Beginning 
with Brown v. Board of Education, hundreds of schools, and, eventually, thousands of other 
government institutions that were sued for constitutional and federal statutory violations came under 
the dominion of injunctions and consent decrees.  Prisons, child welfare agencies, mental retardation 
institutions, and city housing authorities are among the many local government institutions that have 
been subjected to extended periods of judicial supervision.” 
 
69 By the conclusion of the trial, Judge Justice had heard the “testimony of 349 witnesses and had 
received approximately 1,565 exhibits into evidence.”  Ruiz v. Estelle, supra note 53 at 1276. 
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But it is impossible for a written opinion to convey the pernicious 
conditions and the pain and degradation which ordinary inmates suffer 
within TDC prison walls—the gruesome experiences of youthful first 
offenders forcibly raped; the cruel and justifiable fears of inmates 
wondering when they will be called upon to defend the next violent 
assault; the sheer misery, the discomfort, the wholesale loss of privacy 
for prisoners housed with one, two or three others in a forty-five foot 
cell or suffocatingly packed together in a crowed dormitory; the 
physical suffering and the wretched psychological stress which must 
be endured by those sick or injured who cannot obtain adequate 
medical care; the sense of abject helplessness felt by inmates arbitrarily 
sent to solitary confinement or administrative segregation without 
proper opportunity to defend themselves or to argue their causes; the 
bitter frustration of inmates prevented from petitioning the courts and 
other governmental authorities for relief from perceived injustices.   
 
For those who are incarcerated within the parameters of TDC, these 
conditions and experiences form the content and essence of daily 
existence.  It is to these conditions that each inmate must wake every 
morning; it is with the painful knowledge of their existence that each 
inmate must try to sleep at night.  But these iniquitous and distressing 
circumstances are prohibited by the great constitutional principles that 
no human being, regardless of how disfavored by society, shall be 
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment or be deprived of the due 
process of the law within the United States of America.  Regrettably, 
state officials have not upheld their responsibility to enforce these 
principles.  In the wake of their default, the United States Constitution 
must be enforced within the confines of TDC by court order.”70 
After this memorandum opinion was entered, in an attached, but separate order, Judge 
Justice gave the parties a general outline of what had to be accomplished to remedy 
the prison system and ordered the parties to meet and attempt to reach agreement.  
After the case was affirmed on appeal, the parties reached agreement on many 
issues—making it unnecessary for Judge Justice to impose more detailed remedies 
himself.71 
70 Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. at 1390, supra note 53 (Emphasis added.). 
 
For an excellent synopsis of how the Ruiz v. Estelle litigation was started, see William Wayne Justice, 
“The Origins of Ruiz v. Estelle,” 43 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1990) and Kemerer, WILLIAM WAYNE JUSTICE: A
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 62. 
 
71 Ruiz v. Estelle, supra note 53.  
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As was common in the prison institutional litigation context, and specifically 
illustrated in Ruiz v. Estelle, often, a judge’s remedial order in an institutional lawsuit 
will be the outcome of negotiation between the parties, in which the judge may 
participate.  The result is a “consent” decree—so named because it is, at least 
nominally, an arrangement that both the state defendant and plaintiffs have accepted, 
though neither may be entirely satisfied.72 
“Consent decrees are a form of settlement in which the parties agree to 
end the litigation in return for a promise that one (or both) of them will 
change their conduct for a specified period of time, sometimes 
indefinitely.  They are entered as a judgment of the court and are 
enforceable in the same way as court injunctions . . . ”.73 
There are three important features of consent decrees to note: (1) entering into a 
consent decree is voluntary; (2) a consent decree carries the force of law; and (3) 
consent decrees are not a finding of legal liability.  A consent decree is an order of a 
court; parties in violation of a consent decree are subject to the full range of judicial 
sanctions including the issuance of structural injunctions compelling compliance and 
being held in contempt of court.74 As such, a consent decree is an agreement 
 
There was an order accompanying this Ruiz v. Estelle memorandum opinion which identified key areas 
of needed TDC reform, such as minimal safeguards for personal safety of the inmates, staff brutality, 
and prison medical care, and ordered government submissions as to appropriate injunction relief, to 
follow.  The parties agreed to settle the litigation before specific structural injunctive relief was ordered 
and Judge Justice approved their broad consent decree, which permitted court supervision over the 
penal institutions in Texas as they undertook the agreed institutional reform.  
 
72 If the first efforts executing the consent decree to achieve the desired result do not produce the 
preferred outcomes, or if conditions change so much so that the initial remedy no longer works, the 
judge may modify the remedies at a later point in time even if they are the product of a consent decree.  
The Supreme Court has ruled that in institutional reform litigation, “a party seeking modification of a 
consent decree must establish that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree 
and that the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.” Rufo v. Inmates of 
the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992). 
 
73 Michael W. McConnell, “Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies from 
Political Change,” 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL. FORUM 295, 296. 
74 The United States Supreme Court has underscored that judges are free to use their power to enforce 
consent decrees: “Federal courts are not reduced to approving consent decrees and hoping for 
compliance.  Once entered, a consent decree may be enforced.”   Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 440 
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voluntarily entered by the parties to a lawsuit, in lieu of continuing the litigation, 
given the force of law by judicial approval, with no finding of legal liability.  A 
consent decree may be an attractive solution to all parties to effectuate reform on their 
own terms.  
 A challenge facing institutional reform litigators is finding ways to achieve 
compliance from state defendants.  After all, from the applicant’s perspective, if the 
government was doing its job in the first place a lawsuit would not have been 
necessary.  In such a situation, if the government defendant agrees to a consent 
decree, it can increase the likelihood that it will be implemented.  Moreover, because 
a consent decree can mandate more reform than the law requires, parties, and the 
applicants in particular, can offer creative and effective proposals.  The parties are 
also more likely to be better informed about the problems and challenges that the 
government faces in implementation than is the judge.  The parties can build on this 
experience to craft sensible consent decrees. 
“A consent decree is a valuable tool in the effective enforcement of 
civil rights law.  It permits flexibility in adapting a judicial order to the 
particular needs of the case at hand.  That all interested parties have a 
hand in its formation leads to a greater degree of cooperation and 
reduces the inevitable friction that accompanies litigation.  It permits 
imaginative and hence often more effective solutions to practical 
problems.”75 
A consent decree, then, when possible, allows the government to actively chose how 
best to meet its constitutional obligations, leaving the judicial role only to ensure that 
the government complies with the decree.   
From United States’ case law addressing structural injunctive relief, several 
important inferences can be drawn.  Vague, open-ended declaratory orders by the 
 
(2004) (holding that institutional reform consent decrees are consistent with the Eleventh Amendment 
of the United States Constitution). 
 
75 Kindred v. Duckworth, 9 F.3rd 638, 644 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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Supreme Court did not obtain tangible results, such as in Brown II, allowing 
recalcitrant state defendants that did not want to implement those decisions to delay 
implementation.  Structural injunction orders, in contrast, have been shown to be 
better suited to address the implementation of systemic institutional reform.  
Structural injunction orders successfully have been employed by district courts to 
address everything from methods for assigning students to schools, to the number of 
prisoners that may be put into a cell, to the quality of food served in detention 
cafeterias.  In this way, when the state had a vital function to perform, and did not 
perform that duty causing further injuries, courts have actively intervened to provide 
direction and accountability to protect those rights.  
There are additional ways for a district court ordering structural injunctive 
relief to avoid excessive interference with the workings of the other branches of 
government.  The parties can agree on relief, entering into a consent decree, rather 
than have the judge select it herself, as seen in Ruiz v. Estelle. Further, the court can 
appoint a special master and monitor to oversee compliance with either the consent 
decree or court-ordered remedies.  Or, when a structural injunctive remedy is called 
for, and the state defendant exhibits an obdurate resistance to change, the adversarial 
nature of the judicial process—particularly the consideration of the testimony of 
expert witnesses—enables her to order remedies that are neither arbitrary, tyrannical, 
nor the product of the court’s own imagination, but rather remedies that flow logically 
from the court’s findings in the case.     
III. PART THREE: EXPLORING THE USE THE STRUCTURAL INJUNCTION 
REMEDY IN EXISTING SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS CASES.
In keeping with their constitutional obligation to award appropriate, effective 
relief, a number of high courts have granted structural injunction orders in cases 
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dealing with socio-economic rights violations.76 In these decisions, high courts have 
recognized that “the structural [injunction] is particularly suited to a society 
committed, as ours is, to the values of ‘accountability, responsiveness and openness’ 
in a system of democratic governance.”77 Most famous in the South African context 
are the structural injunction orders in Grootboom – High Court78 and Treatment 
Action Campaign – High Court79.
In Grootboom – High Court, Davis J found that (a) the state respondents were 
obliged to provide the applicant children with shelter under section 28(1)(c) of the 
Constitution, that (b) the respondents had failed to provide them with shelter and 
needed to so immediately and  as a consequence, (c) the respondents had to report 
back to the High Court as to the implementation of its order within three months.80 
76 A list of relevant High Court decisions can be found above, supra note 10. 
 
77 S v Zuma and 23 similar cases 2004 (4) BCLR 410 (E) at para 39 (where the court aimed to correct 
systemic difficulties that made it difficult to implement a sentence of committing a juvenile to reform 
school).  
 
78 Grootboom v Oosenberg Municipality supra note 10.  
 
79 Treatment Action Campaign and Others v Minister of Health and Others supra note 10.  
 
80 The actual text of the Grootboom – High Court order reads: 
 
“I propose that an order shall be issued in the following terms: 
 
(1) The application insofar as it relates to housing or adequate housing, and insofar as 
it is based on section 26 of the Constitution, fails and it is dismissed; 
 
(2) It is declared, in terms of section 28 of the Constitution that: 
(a) the applicant children are entitled to be provided with shelter by the appropriate 
organ of state; 
(b) the applicant parents are entitled to be accommodated with their children in the 
aforegoing shelter; and 
(c) the appropriate organ or department of state is obliged to provide the applicant 
children, and their accompanying parents, with such shelter until such time as the 
parents are able to shelter their own children; 
 
(3) The several respondents are directed to present, under oath a report or reports to 
this Court as to the implementation of paragraph (2) above within a period of three 
months from the date of this order; 
 
(4) The applicants shall have a period of one month, after presentation of the 
aforegoing report, to deliver their commentary thereon under oath; 
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After finding a constitutional violation of children’s right to shelter, the High Court 
next considered what would be appropriate relief.  In so doing, Davis J acknowledged 
that before he would be able to order relief best suited to remedy the constitutional 
infraction, more information was needed: 
“[The advocate for several of the state defendants] correctly cautioned 
against an order which would be so general that the respondents 
would not know what was required of them.  It seems to me that the 
relief which can properly be granted at this stage on the available 
evidence is at best declaratory.  The next step, is to endeavour to give 
some practical content to the declaration. It will serve no worthwhile 
purpose to direct the parties to begin again on new papers.  For this 
purpose more information is needed than is presently before us. In 
fairness to the respondents, who now know where their duty lies, they 
should be given an opportunity of proposing a practical solution.  In 
fairness to the applicants, now that they know where their rights lie, 
respondents should be directed to make such proposals within a 
reasonable time.  The applicants should furthermore have the 
opportunity of commenting on the proposals, and the respondents 
should be allowed to respond to such comment.”81 
This statement by the High Court judge is significant for a couple of reasons.  It 
reflects an understanding by a government representative that vague, declaratory 
orders asserting a socio-economic right do not meaningfully direct the state how to 
remedy that right.  Recognizing the limited record before him to craft an appropriate 
remedy—rather than superimpose his own remedy on the parties based on his own 
opinions and conjecture—Davis J requested reports and comments from all parties to 
assist in determining a remedy.  This underscores the reticence of courts, rightfully so, 
 
(5) The respondents shall have a further period of two weeks to deliver their replies 
under oath to the applicants’ commentary; 
 
(6) There will be no order as to the costs of these proceedings up to the date of this 
judgment; 
(7) The case is postponed to a date fixed by the Registrar for consideration and 
determination of the aforesaid report, commentary and replies; 
 
(8) The order of Josman AJ dated 4 June 1999 will remain in force until such time as 
the further proceedings contemplated by the preceding paragraph have been 
completed.”   Grootboom – High Court supra note 10 at 293H-J – 294A-C. 
 
81 Id. at 292B-D (Italics added.).  
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to order remedies which come only from the findings of the case.  Rather, as Davis J 
did in this case, courts can declare the parameters of a socio-economic right, solicit 
plans and encourage agreement by the parties to remedy the constitutional violation 
with as limited court involvement as practicable.   
 Despite this reasonable and balanced order from the High Court, the 
Constitutional Court acted to replace the High Court initial injunction order with a 
declaratory order that the state was in breach of one of its constitutional obligations.82 
This order required the state to act to meet its obligation to provide access to housing, 
but it did not include any judicial supervision over the implementation of the order, 
nor did it mention time frames within which the state had to act.83 The Constitutional 
Court noted that in terms of monitoring, the South African Human Rights 
Commission (“SAHRC”) had agreed to observe and report on the state’s compliance 
with its Grootboom obligations.84 Consequently, this meant that if it was alleged that 
 
82 The Constitutional Court also rejected the holding of the High Court that the state was in breach of 
its section 28 duty to provide shelter to children; instead, finding that the state was in breach of its 
section 26 obligation to devise a comprehensive program to realize the right of access to adequate 
housing.  Grootboom supra note 8 at paras 80-92. 
 
83 The text of the Constitutional Court’s order in Grootboom reads: 
“The following order is made: 
1. The appeal is allowed in part. 
2. The order of the Cape of Good Hope High Court is set aside and the following is 
substituted for it: 
 ‘It is declared that: 
(a) Section 26(2) of the Constitution requires the State to devise and 
implement within its available resources a comprehensive and co-ordinated 
program progressively to realise the right of access to adequate housing. 
(b) The program must include reasonable measures such as, but not 
necessarily limited to, those contemplated in the Accelerated Managed Land 
Settlement Program, to provide relief for people who have no access to land, 
no roof over their heads, and who are living in intolerable conditions or 
crisis situations. 
(c) As at the date of the launch of this application, the State housing 
program in the area of the Cape Metropolitan Council fell short of 
compliance with the requirements in para (b), in that it failed to make 
reasonable provision within its available resources for people in the Cape 
Metropolitan area with no access to land, no roof over their heads, and who 
were living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations.” 
3. There is no order as to costs.” 
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the government was not complying with its orders in terms of the judgment, a new 
case would have to be brought.  
 The remedy selected by the Constitutional Court in Grootboom has been the 
source of academic discussion and criticism.85 While the SAHRC agreed to monitor 
the compliance of the state as to the Grootboom orders, its reporting has been 
incomplete;86 focusing on the situation in the applicants’ community without ensuring 
full compliance of the judgment, which “requires systemic changes to national, 
provincial and local housing programmes to cater for people in desperate and crisis 
situations.”87 
84Grootboom supra note 8 at para 97 (“In the circumstances, [SAHRC] will monitor and, if necessary, 
report in terms of these powers on the efforts made by the State to comply with its s 26 obligations in 
accordance with this judgment.”).  
 
Section 184(3) of the South African Constitution enjoins “relevant organs of state to provide the 
[SAHRC] on the measures that they have taken towards the realisation of the rights in the Bill of 
Rights concerning housing, health care, food, water, social security, education and the environment.” 
 
85 Some of the many scholarly articles written about Grootboom are listed above, supra note 3. 
 
See also, Sandra Liebenberg, “The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for 
Policy Reform in South Africa,” 17 SAJHR 232 (2001) (characterizing Grootboom as a positive 
precedent for the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights); Cass R. Sunstein, “Social and 
Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa,” 11 CONSTITUTIONAL FORUM 123 (2001) (praising the 
restraint of the Constitutional Court in upholding socio-economic rights while allowing the political 
branches of government wide discretion); Theunis Roux, “Understanding Grootboom – A Response to 
Cass R. Sunstein,” 12 CONSTITUITONAL FORUM 46 (2002) (arguing that the Constitutional Court was 
reluctant to prioritize access to housing over competing social needs); Bilchitz, “Giving Socio-
Economic Rights Teeth,” supra note 5; Wesson, :Grootboom and Beyond,” supra note 9. 
 
86 A SAHRC report filed with Constitutional Court over a year after the Grootboom judgment was 
handed down indicates that it took over one year for the local administration (City of Cape Town) and 
the Western Cape provincial administration to finally decide where the “locus of responsibility” lay 
with regard to the implementation of the Court’s order.  One can safely deduce if the various organs of 
state were squabbling as to who was responsible for carrying out the Grootboom order, that no progress 
was made during that time to actually aid the applicants.  See Pillay, “Implementing Grootboom:
Supervision needed,” supra note 3. 
 
87 Pillay criticizes the efficacy of having the SAHRC monitor the Grootboom judgment because the 
SAHRC is not required to report back to the Court in the actual Grootboom order and because there is a 
lack of clarity as to what the scope of monitoring should be, as explained in the following: 
 
“There is a clear lack of understanding that the judgment requires systemic changes 
to national, provincial and local housing programmes to cater for people in desperate 
and crisis situations . . . . The SAHRC has tended to focus more on monitoring the 
implementation of the first order dealing with the situation of the first order dealing 
with the situation of the Grootboom community.  There is a lack of information on 
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While there is agreement that it is a positive step for the nascent socio-
economic rights’ jurisprudence to declare part of the government’s housing program 
to be unreasonable because it failed to provide those in desperate need with 
emergency housing, there is real controversy as to whether the declaratory relief 
ordered resulted in any actual improvement of the housing program itself.88 The 
primary complaint has been that because there is no accountability over or 
enforcement of the Grootboom order, the declaratory order has been complied with 
shallowly by relevant state institutions.  Roux describes this minimal compliance as 
follows: 
“An interesting aspect of the Grootboom case, and a further illustration 
of the way in which the Court sought to manage its relationship with 
the political branches, concerns the order handed down at the end of 
the judgment . . . . ‘a reasonable part of the national housing budget to 
be devoted to [providing relief to those in desperate need]’ was not 
made part of the order, which was entirely declaratory.  In the result, 
the political branches were not strictly speaking required to do 
anything in response to the Court’s decision in Grootboom. In 
practice, it appears that the political branches have responded to the 
judgment but the response has been fairly low-key, with a requirement 
having been set that 0.55% to 0.75% of the provincial housing budget 
be allocated to meeting the temporary accommodation needs of victims 
of flood and dire disasters.”89 
For the applicants, the result of Grootboom has been that, several years after the order 
was entered, there has been little tangible change in the housing policy to cater for 
 
whether nationally and at provincial level there is compliance with the obligation to 
put in place and implement accelerated land release programmes.”  Pillay, 
“Implementing Grootboom: Supervision needed,” supra note 3. 
 
88 As Pillay also explains, “[t]he decision of the Constitutional Court in the Grootboom case has been 
hailed as a great victory for the homeless and landless people of South Africa.  However, the actual 
impact of the judgment on the housing situation of the litigants and others who find themselves in a 
similar situation has been less dramatic.” Pillay, “Implementing Grootboom: Supervision needed,” 
supra note 3.  
 
89 Theunis Roux, “Legitimating Transformation: Political Resource Allocation in the South African 
Constitutional Court,” in DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY, Siri Gloppen, et al, eds (Frank 
Cross: 2004), available at: http://www.law.wits.ac.za/lt/pdf/Norway_paper.pdf (last checked on 1 June 
2006) at fn 28. 
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people who find themselves in desperate or crisis situations.90 This much-publicized 
lack of compliance with the order illustrates that the SAHRC and the Constitutional 
Court has been ineffective in requiring government responsiveness to the Grootboom 
order.91 This grievous delay could have been avoided if the Constitutional Court had 
either affirmed the High Court’s balanced injunction order or instituted its own 
structural injunction order.  
In another example of a case ordering structural injunctive relief, Treatment 
Action Campaign – High Court, Botha J found that the national Minister of Health 
and respective members of the executive councils responsible for health in all 
provinces92 (“the respondents”) were constitutionally obligated under section 27 of 
the Constitution to plan and to implement an effective, comprehensive and 
progressive program for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV, that 
they had failed to deliver on these constitutional obligations by refusing to make 
Nevirapine available in the public health sector and consequently, ordered that the 
 
90 See, e.g., on the issue of whether the Grootboom judgment made any significant difference for the 
applicant community, a report in the Sunday Times entitled “Treatment with Contempt” stated: 
 
“Grootboom is a part of Wallecedene, a large shantytown on the eastern side of 
Kraaifontein, a working-class area about 30 km inland from Cape Town along the 
N1.  Grootboom is named after Irene Grootboom, a woman who made legal history 
and then apparently disappeared. 
 
Grootboom and 900 other applicants successfully contested in their 1998 eviction 
from a site in Wallacedene when the Constitutional Court ruled in their favour in 
October 2000. 
 
Today, all that the site of Grootboom has to show is the smelly ablution block, built 
in a donga that had served as a latrine for the squatters who went to court.”  THE 
SUNDAY TIMES, 21 MARCH 2004. 
 
91 See, e.g., Pillay, “Implementing Grootboom: Supervision needed,” supra note 3; Bilchitz, “Giving 
Socio-economic Rights Teeth,” supra note 9 at 24-25; Pieterse, “Coming to Terms with Judicial 
Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights,” supra note 9 at 414-15. 
 
92 The respondents included all respective members of the executive councils (“MEC”) responsible for 
health, except for the Western Cape MEC.  As was explained in footnote 4 of the Treatment Action 
Campaign decision, “[t]he Western Cape MEC was originally a party to the proceedings in the High 
Court.  The applicants later withdrew the application against him.” 
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respondents had to report back to the High Court as to the implementation of its order 
within three months.93 Botha J explained the need for supervisory jurisdiction over 
the respondents, in the following excerpt from the judgment: 
 
93 The full text of the Treatment Action Campaign – High Court order is as follows: 
 
“The following order is granted:  
1. It is declared that the first to ninth respondents are obliged to make Nevirapine 
available to pregnant women with HIV who give birth in the public health sector, and 
to their babies, in public health facilities to which the respondents’ present 
programme for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV has not yet 
been extended, where in the judgment of the attending medical officer, acting in 
consultation with the medical superintendent of the facility concerned, this is 
medically indicated, which shall at least include that the woman concerned has been 
appropriately tested and counselled. 
 
2. The first to ninth respondents are ordered to make Nevirapine available to pregnant 
women with HIV who give birth in the public sector, and to their babies, in public 
health facilities to which the respondents’ present programme for the prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV has not yet been extended, where in the opinion 
of the attending medical practitioner, acting in consultation with the medical 
superintendent of the facility concerned, this is medically indicated, which shall at 
least include that the woman concerned has been appropriately tested and counseled. 
 
3. It is declared that the respondents are under a duty forthwith to plan an effective 
comprehensive national programme to prevent or reduce the mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV, including the provision of voluntary counselling and testing, 
and where appropriate, Nevirapine or other appropriate medicine, and formula milk 
for feeding, which programme must provide for its progressive implementation to the 
whole of the Republic, and to implement it in a reasonable manner. 
 
4. The respondents are ordered forthwith to plan an effective comprehensive national 
programme to prevent or reduce the mother-to-child transmission of HIV, including 
the provision of voluntary counselling and testing, and where appropriate, Nevirapine 
or other appropriate medicine, and formula milk for feeding, which programme must 
provide for its progressive implementation to the whole of the Republic, and to 
implement it in a reasonable manner. 
 
5. Each of the respondents is ordered to deliver, before 31 March 2002, a report or 
reports which set out, under oath: 
 5.1 what he or she has done to implement the order in paragraph 4 
5.2 what further steps he or she will take to implement the order in  
 paragraph 4, and when he or she will take each such step 
 
6. The applicants may within a month of delivery of such reports deliver their replies, 
under oath, to the respondents’ reports. 
 
7. The respondents may within two weeks of delivery of such reports deliver their 
answers to the replies of the applicants. 
 
8. The application is postponed to a date to be fixed by the Registrar for the 
consideration and determination of the said reports, replies and answers. 
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“The programme of the respondents lacks the impetus that is required 
for a programme that must move progressively.  If there is no time-
scale, there must be some other built-in impetus to maintain the 
momentum of progression.  It must be goal driven.  As stated in 
Grootboom case . . . there is a balance between goal and means.  
Sometimes the goal will enforce the creation of the means.  Sometimes 
the attainment of the goal will be delayed for lack of means.  What I 
find unacceptable in the respondents’ approach is the formulation that 
once the lessons have been learnt from the test and research sites, the 
roll-out will follow as the means allow.  That does no justice to the 
exigency of the case.”94 
Since the respondents had in place only an open-ended, largely undetermined mother-
to-child HIV prevention program, one which left all planning for the future, more than 
a declaratory order was needed to ensure timely, meaningful government action.  As a 
result, the process leading up to a structural injunction order was initiated.95 
The Constitutional Court upheld the main findings of Botha J—that the state’s 
preventive mother-to-child transmission program was “inflexible,” “unreasonable” 
and “a breach of the State’s obligations under [section] 27(2) read with [section] 
27(1)(a) of the Constitution.”96 The Constitutional Court then ordered that the 
government needed to, without delay, “remove the restrictions” that prevent the use of 
Nevirapine, to “permit and facilitate” its use, and to “take reasonable measures to 
extend the testing and counselling facilities at hospitals and clinics throughout the 
public health sector to facilitate and expedite the use of Nevirapine for the purpose of 
reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV.”97 
9. The first to ninth respondents are ordered to pay the applicants’ costs, including 
the costs attendant upon the employment of two counsel.”  Treatment Action 
Campaign – High Court, supra note 10 at 386-87. 
 
94 Treatment Action Campaign – High Court, supra note 10 at 385. 
 
95 Supra note 93. 
 
96 Treatment Action Campaign, supra note 6 at para 80.  
 
97 Treatment Action Campaign, supra note 6 at para 135. 
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There is a noteworthy difference between the High Court order and the 
Constitutional Court one, which is the removal of supervisory jurisdiction over 
government compliance.98 Despite the applicants requesting a structural interdict to 
 
98 The full text of the Constitutional Court order in Treatment Action Campaign states: 
 
“We accordingly make the following orders: 
1. The orders made by the High Court are set aside and the following orders are 
substituted. 
2. It is declared that: 
(a) Sections 27(1) and (2) of the Constitution require the government to 
devise and implement within its available resources a comprehensive and 
co-ordinated programme to realise progressively the right rights of pregnant 
women and their newborn children to have access to health services to 
combat mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 
(b) The programme to be realised progressively within available resources 
must include reasonable measures for counselling and testing pregnant 
women for HIV, counselling HIV-positive pregnant women on the options 
open to them to reduce the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV, and 
making appropriate treatment available to them for such purpose. 
(c) The policy for reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV 
as formulated and implemented by government fell short of compliance with 
the requirements in subparas (a) and (b) in that: 
(i) Doctors at public hospitals and clinics other than the research 
and training sites were not enabled to prescribe Nevirapine to 
reduce the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV even where 
it was medically indicated and adequate facilities existed for the 
testing and counselling of pregnant women concerned. 
(ii) The policy failed to make provision for counsellors at hospitals 
and clinics other than at research and training sites to be trained in 
counselling for the use of Nevirapine as a means of reducing the 
risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 
3. Government is ordered without delay to: 
(a) Remove the restrictions that prevent Nevirapine from being made 
available for the purpose of reducing the risk of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV at public hospitals and clinics that are not research and 
training sites. 
(b) Permit and facilitate the use of Nevirapine for the purpose of reducing 
the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV and to make it available for 
this purpose at hospitals and clinics when in the judgment of the attending 
medical practitioner acting in consultation with the medical superintendent 
of the facility concerned this is medically indicated, which shall if necessary 
include that the mother concerned has been appropriately tested and 
counseled. 
(c) Make provision if necessary for counsellors based at public hospitals and 
clinics other than the research and training sites to be trained for the 
counselling necessary for the use of Nevirapine to reduce the risk of mother-
to-child transmission of HIV. 
(d) Take reasonable measures to extend the testing and counselling facilities 
at hospitals and clinics throughout the public health sector to facilitate and 
expedite the use of Nevirapine for the purpose of reducing the risk of 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 
4. The orders made in para 3 do not preclude government from adapting its policy in 
a manner consistent with the Constitution if equally appropriate or better methods 
become available to it for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 
Hirsch  20/09/2006 
 39
ensure government compliance for providing Nevirapine and the roll-out of national 
program for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV, the Constitutional 
Court declined to monitor the implementation of its order, explaining that the state has 
always respected and executed orders of the Constitutional Court.99 Accordingly, the 
Court held that there was need to believe the government would not obey its orders in 
this case: 
The order made by the High Court included a structural [injunction] 
requiring the appellants [the respondents] to revise their policy and to 
submit the revised policy to the court to enable it to satisfy itself that 
the policy was inconsistent with the Constitution . . . . In appropriate 
cases they should exercise such a power if it is necessary to secure 
compliance with a court order.  That may be because of a failure to 
heed declaratory orders or other relief granted by a Court in a 
particular case.  We do not consider, however, that orders should be 
made in those terms unless this is necessary.  The government has 
always respected and executed orders of this Court.  There is no reason 
to believe that it will not do so in the present case.”100 
This deferential order, also made without any provision of supervisory jurisdiction, 
too, has been controversial because of the government’s resistance to this court 
order.101 
5. The government must pay the applicants’ costs, including the cost of two counsel. 
6. The application by government to adduce further evidence is refused.”  Treatment 
Action Campaign, supra note 6 at para 135.  
 
99 See Swart, “Left out in the cold?” supra note 3 at 222-24. 
 
100 Treatment Action Campaign, supra note 6 at para 129 (Emphasis added.).  
 
101 For example, Bilchitz has expressed real concern with the Constitutional Court’s faith in the 
government to act quickly to provide Nevirapine to all public hospitals: 
 
“[T]his seems like a strikingly bad moment to express good faith in the government’s 
ability to deliver nevirapine expeditiously.  The policy of the government in relation 
to HIV is notable for its very slow progress in coming to terms with the health crisis 
facing the country.  There has been a tremendous amount of bungling and a high 
decree of reluctance to provide nevirapine.  At one point prior to the release of the 
judgment, the Minister of Health threatened to disobey the court order on national 
television.  We are also concerned with the very serious matter that this drug has the 
potential to prevent a life-threatening disease.  It is of the utmost urgency that 
nevirapine be dispensed immediately.  Under these conditions, it seems that the Court 
should have been prepared to ensure that its order is implemented as soon as 
possible.  Whilst it may be politically important to show confidence in the 
government, the importance of the interests concerned argue in favour of a more 
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The Constitutional Court set out the extent to which the state’s mother-to-child 
transmission prevention policy fell short of the requirements of reasonableness and 
directed government to remove all restrictions to the availability of Nevirapine in 
circumstances where the capacity to administer it existed and where it was medically 
indicated.  The Court, however, did not include any supervisory jurisdiction to 
monitor government compliance with its order, despite the Court explicitly finding 
that an order to that effect—as was made in the High Court—fell within its judicial 
powers.102 This decision has been widely regarded as “curious and even 
irresponsible” in light of publicly expressed opposition by the Minister of Health as to 
the implementation of the order, even before it had been handed down.103 
Since the requested structural injunction order was not granted by the 
Constitutional Court and the High Court order requiring supervisory jurisdiction 
replaced by the Constitutional Court one, the applicants themselves were compelled, 
by default, to ensure government fulfilment of the Treatment Action Campaign order.  
Consequently, the applicant had to resort to contempt proceedings to secure 
compliance with the Treatment Action Campaign judgment in certain provinces.104 
stringent approach.  The measured cautious approach of the Court is inappropriate in 
relation to the interests of such importance.”  Bilchitz, “Towards a Reasonable 
Approach to the Minimum Core,” supra note 5 at 23-24.  
 
102 Treatment Action Campaign supra note 6, at paras 97-114, 129. 
 
103 Pieterse, “Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights,” supra note 9 at 
415-16.   
 
See also, Bilchitz, “Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core,” supra notes 5 and 101; 
Mark Heywood, “Preventing Mother-to-Child HIV Transmission in South Africa: Background, 
Strategies and Outcomes of the Treatment Action Campaign Case Against the Minister of Health,” 19 
SAJHR 278, 308-09 (2003); Mark Heywood, “Contempt or compliance? The TAC case after the 
Constitutional Court judgment,” VOL. 4, NO. 1 ESR REVIEW (MARCH 2003) (“Contempt of 
compliance?).  
 
104 As Heywood described, the Treatment Action Campaign has tried, on its own, to ensure government 
compliance with the Court’s order, resulting in further contempt proceedings in TAC v MEC for 
Health, Mpumalanga and Minister of Health, TPD 35272/02. 
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Passing the responsibility of ensuring government fulfilment of a court order to civil 
society, community groups and individual applicants is improper.  It directly 
contradicts the principle upheld by the Treatment Action Campaign judgment itself 
that, “[w]here a breach of any right has taken place, including a socio-economic right, 
a Court is under a duty to ensure that effective relief is granted.”105 If a court, like the 
Constitutional Court, has the responsibility to ensure effectual relief is achieved, it is 
inappropriate to shirk that obligation by requiring to civil society, community groups 
or the applicants themselves to do it instead.106 
From an exploration of the orders in Grootboom and Treatment Action 
Campaign, it is clear the Constitutional Court has not yet stated any set timeframes or 
minimum standards from which either the full extent of the citizenry’s socio-
economic entitlements can be gleaned or of the state’s socio-economic obligations 
may be derived.  Socio-economic constitutional rights have enforceability—that much 
is known from the declaratory orders—but as of yet, it is still unclear what the 
government must specifically do in order to satisfy its constitutional obligations.  The 
discussion cannot end here, however.   
There has been an interesting development requiring government compliance 
with the Constitutional Court’s socio-economic rights judgments by executing 
structural injunction orders, as exemplified by the judgment of Selikowitz J in City of 
 
“It should be evident that the TAC case is still ongoing.  Although Mpumalanga is in 
the process of being forced into compliance, this is many months after the original 
order and undoubtedly at a cost of many lives.  Further, social movements like the 
TAC have a limited capacity to monitor and ensure compliance . . . . Although the 
etiology of the ‘benefit of the doubt’ approach of the Court in not asserting its 
supervisory powers may have been understandable, with hindsight it may have been 
mistaken.”  Heywood, “Contempt or compliance?” supra note 103.  
 
105 Treatment Action Campaign, supra note 6 at para 106 (Italics added.). 
 
106 In fairness, in contrast with the Grootboom order, however, the relatively high level of specificity in 
the Treatment Action Campaign order enabled the applicants to play a more proactive role in 
monitoring compliance with the order.  See, e.g., Mark Heywood, “Contempt or compliance?” supra 
note 103; Pieterse, “Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights,” supra 
note 9 at 415. 
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Cape Town v Rudolph and Others.107 This decision is reminiscent of judgments like 
Green,108 Swann,109 and Davis,110 a few of the many United States district court cases 
implementing true desegregation reform after Brown II through the use of structural 
injunction orders.  In each of these decisions, the lower court relied on a judgment of 
its highest court, which, in a declaratory order, held that a violation of a certain 
constitutional right could not be tolerated, as the necessary authority to order 
structural injunctive relief to remedy continued violations of that same constitutional 
right. 
In City of Cape Town v Rudolph, the relevant issue was whether the City of 
Cape Town had complied with its constitutional obligations as set out by the 
Constitutional Court in its Grootboom judgment and if not, what the appropriate 
remedy ought to be.111 Selikowitz J found that the government had not satisfied its 
constitutional obligation to make reasonable provision for access to housing, despite 
the Constitutional Court’s order in Grootboom.
“The Constitutional Court has pronounced upon the nature of [the 
government’s] constitutional obligations.  It declared that the housing 
programme in the area in question was inconsistent with the 
Constitution, for its failure to make reasonable provision for people 
with no access to land, no roof over their heads, and who are living in 
intolerable conditions or crisis situations.  It held that the local 
authority is under a duty to implement a programme such as the 
AMLSP with due regard to the urgency of the situation it is intended to 
address.  [The government’s] response, more than a year later, is: 
 
107 City of Cape Town v Rudolph and Others, supra note 10.  
 
108 Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, supra note 52.  
 
109 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecknlenburg Bd. of Educ, supra note 59.  
 
110 Davis v. School Commissioners of Mobile County, supra note 59.  
 
111 “The issue in this counter-application, two and a half years after the judgment in the Grootboom 
case, is whether the applicant has complied with its constitutional duties as declared by the 
Constitutional Court – and if not, what should be the appropriate remedy.”  City of Cape Town v 
Rudolph, supra note 10 at 79H. 
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a. in effect to acknowledge that it has not implemented any 
such programme; 
b. to give no indication that it has any intention of 
implementing such a programme; 
• to insist that it will continue to deal with applicants purely 
on the basis of when their name was placed on the waiting 
list; and 
• to deny that people who live in cars; in the streets; under the 
stairs at a school’ in the bushes; or at places outside 
wherever they can find shelter at night, and who have 
literally nowhere they may lawfully live, are living in 
intolerable conditions or that they are in crisis situations. 
 
I find, on the evidence before me, that [the government] has displayed, 
and continues to display, an unacceptable disregard for the order of 
the Constitutional Court—and therefore for the Constitution itself.”112 
Accordingly, the High Court held that in the circumstances, given the extreme 
government denial in its failure to recognize its obligation to elevate the plight of the 
homeless applicants and its lack of action regarding the Constitutional Court’s 
Grootboom order, that this was an appropriate situation to enter a structural interdict 
order.113 
112 City of Cape Town v Rudolph, supra note 10 at 83J – 84A-D (Emphasis added.). 
 
113 See supra note 10 for a great quote from the City of Cape Town v Rudolph Court as to the need to 
enter a structural injunction order in this instance, given the state’s lack of compliance with the 
Grootboom declaratory order. 
 
Also, in City of Cape Town v Rudolph, Selikowitz J made the following order, in relevant part: 
 
“2. In the counter-application: 
 2.1 It is declared that the housing programme of the City of Cape Town fails to comply with   
 the constitutional and statutory obligations of the City of Cape Town in that: 
2.1.1 it does not make short-term provision for people in Valhalla Park who are in a crisis 
or in a desperate situation; 
2.1.2 it does not provide any form of relief for people in Valhalla Park who are in a crisis 
or in a desperate situation; 
2.1.3 it fails to give adequate priority and resources to the needs to the people in Valhalla 
Park who have no access to a place where they may lawfully live; 
2.1.4 in the allocation of housing, it fails to have any or adequate regard to relevant factors 
other than the length of time an applicant for housing has been on the waiting list, and in 
particular does not have regard to the degree and extent of the need of the applicants; 
2.1.5 it has not been implemented in such a manner that the right to access to housing of 
residents of Valhalla Park is progressively realised. 
3. The City of Cape Town is ordered to comply with its constitutional and statutory obligations 
as declared in this order. 
4. The City of Cape Town is ordered within four months of the date of this order to deliver a 
report or reports under oath, stating what steps it has taken to comply with its constitutional and 
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This order is important in that it reflects the recognition by a High Court judge 
that often a declaratory order alone will be inadequate to ensure government 
protection of a constitutional right.  More direction and guidance will be needed to 
achieve government compliance.  In this way, a structural injunction order—through 
submitting plans and establishing reporting guidelines—is necessary to require the 
government to comply with its constitutional and statutory obligations.   
This analysis is not meant to discount the importance of underlying decisions, 
such as the Grootboom judgment, which gave meaning and texture to the right of 
access to adequate housing.  This will always be a crucial first step.  Rather, this 
Article argues subsequent enforcement judgments are necessary to ensure that the 
promises to remedy constitutional violations made in these fundamental rights 
judgments, like the Grootboom decision, are actually carried out.  Because judgments 
like Grootboom lack any specific guidelines or time deadlines for government action, 
the government has little incentive to move quickly, or at all, to ensure meaningful 
compliance with its order.  Furthermore, institutional reform applicants, community 
groups and civil society seldom have the resources to monitor government action to 
maintain pressure for compliance nor should they be forced to.  Consequently, 
judgments with structural injunction orders attached following initial rulings, like the 
 
statutory obligations as declared in this order, what further steps it will take in that regard, and 
when such future steps will be taken. 
5. The respondents in the main application [the homeless class] may within one month of 
delivery of that report or reports, deliver commentary thereon, under oath. 
6. The City of Cape Town may within one month of delivery of that commentary, deliver its 
reply to that commentary under oath. 
7. Thereafter, the matter is to be enrolled on a date to be fixed by the Registrar in consultation 
with the presiding Judge for consideration and determination of the aforesaid report, 
commentary and reply. 
8. The City of Cape Town is ordered to pay the costs of the counter-application.” Id. At 89I-J – 
90A-H. 
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one in City of Cape Town v Rudolph, become essential to ensure that the necessary 
and appropriate constitutional relief is realized.114 
IV. PART FOUR: A DEFENSE OF THE STRUCTURAL INJUNCTION REMEDY FOR 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS CASES IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Although it is clear that it can be implemented successfully, the structural 
injunction order is not without its own controversies.  Some argue that the 
implementation of a structural injunction order violates the separation of powers 
between branches of governments.  Others contend that judges are ill-equipped to 
make such policy decisions because as they are polycentric and complex; and that 
enforcement is best left to the political branches.  In this final section, this Article 
addresses these complaints and defends why, despite these criticisms, structural 
injunction orders are suitable and, in some cases, essential to ensure appropriate and 
effective relief.  
At the most simplistic level, some argue that courts simply have no business 
telling a state institution how to operate its pension system, its schools, its prison 
system or any other public institution.  This is nonsensical.  Judges may make decrees 
which require massive expenditure without any regard to the budgetary consequences, 
particularly by way of enforcing civil and political rights.115 This is in contrast to the 
executive and legislative branches of government where the budge is an important 
 
114 “Since trial court remedial discretion in institutional suit is inevitably political in nature, it must be 
regarded as presumptively illegitimate. But [Fletcher] concludes that the presumption of illegitimacy 
may be overcome when the political bodies that should ordinarily exercise such discretion are seriously 
and chronically in default.  In that event, and for so long as those political bodies remain in default, 
judicial discretion may be a necessary and therefore legitimate substitute for political discretion.”  
Fletcher, “The Discretionary Constitution,” supra note 2 at 637 (Emphasis added.). 
 
115 See, e.g., Mureinik, “Beyond a Charter of Luxuries,” supra note 13 at 466 (suggesting that an order 
of habeas corpus, for example, has costly financial consequences for the government because the effect 
is “to burden the state with the massive costs of a criminal justice system.”). 
 
See also, Darrel Moellendorf, “Reasoning about Resources: Soobramoney and the Future of Socio-
Economic Rights Claims,” 14 SAJHR 327, 331 (1998) (arguing that the Constitutional Court may pass 
judgments on all socio-economic rights, as with other rights, that require a change in fiscal position). 
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input to a decision.  As noted by the Constitutional Court in Treatment Action 
Campaign, all orders, including declaratory orders, can have profound financial and 
policy implications on the state; that fact alone cannot justify courts not ordering 
appropriate relief.116 
“A court may require the provision of legal aid, or the extension of state benefits 
to a class of people who formerly were not beneficiaries of such benefits.  In our 
view, it cannot be said that by including socio-economic rights within a bill of 
rights, a task is conferred upon the courts so different from that ordinarily 
conferred upon them by a bill of rights that it results in a breach of separation of 
powers.”117 
Moreover, every judicial order implies an allocation of public funds sufficient to 
enforce it; “the enforcement costs of even routine private litigation are often 
substantial, and enforcement often depends on the discretionary initiative of public 
officials, such as sheriffs charged with finding and executing on a defendant’s 
assets.”118 
The enforcement of all rights has policy implications.119 When a positive 
order in relation to any right may have far-reaching consequences, it is certainly 
appropriate for the courts to allow a margin of choice to the executive and legislature.  
 
116 “There is also no merit in the argument advanced on behalf of the government that a distinction 
should be drawn between declaratory and mandatory orders against government.  Even simple 
declaratory orders against government or organs of State can affect their policy and may well have 
budgetary implications.  Government is constitutionally bound to give effect to such orders whether or 
not they affect its policy and has to find the resources to do so.  Thus, in the Mpumalanga case, this 
Court set aside a provincial government’s policy decision to terminate the payment of subsidies to 
certain schools and ordered that payments should continue for several months.  Also, in the case of 
August the Court, in order to afford prisoners the right to vote, directed the Electoral Commission to 
alter its election policy, planning and regulations, with manifest cost implications.”  Treatment Action 
Campaign, supra note 6 at para 99. 
 
117 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 at paras 76-78.  
 
118 Sabel and Simon, “Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds,” supra note 30 at 
1059. 
 
119 See, e.g., Fiss, “The Forms of Justice,” supra note 35 (suggesting that all judicial norm declarations 
have policy implications); Sabel and Simon, “Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation 
Succeeds,” supra note 30 at 1059-60 (providing the example of a negligence case, which will often “set 
a standard that raises the costs of a practice or product—costs that may or may not be passed on to 
customers”). 
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However, this does not mean that the courts should abdicate all responsibility for the 
enforcement of those rights to the political branches of government because, as 
illustrated above, it is in effective.   
A slightly more sophisticated criticism of structural injunction orders is that 
courts should defer to the experienced judgment of state institutions in effectuating 
institutional reform.120 This is misguided: just because state officials have made a 
decision, however, does not make it either correct or constitutional.  Also, state 
officials can be unaware of conditions in their own agencies. Agency heads can take 
any criticism of their agency personally; and consequently, they are unable to evaluate 
objectively the agency’s performance.  
 As seen above, in the United States, southern states ignored the Supreme 
Court segregation decisions; in like manner, state institutions often will be fiercely 
resistant to court-imposed changes to business as usual.  State institutions often 
develop an entrenched set of customs and habits that will not be changed merely a 
court by pounding a gavel and solemnly intoning that its practices are 
unconstitutional.121 
Deference to government experience in awarding relief further assumes that 
government actors take seriously the constitutional violations of the applicants.  
Although one would hope so, this is not always the case.  Because of the explicit 
 
120 See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, ‘Controlling the Structural Injunction,” 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 
397 (1984) (“The mechanism used by federal judges to assume control over such a broad range of 
institutions and issues is the injunction.  Injunctive decrees are often so complete and detailed that they 
resemble legislation and administrative regulations.  Sometimes shaped and implemented by quasi-
administrative officials called monitors or masters or receivers, they are used to govern nearly every 
aspect of the decision-making process from trivial to fundamental.”).  
121 For some examples of both U.S. and South African governmental resistance to court orders, see 
supra notes 3, 10, 49, 50, 62, 63. 
 
Also, Fletcher explains that in cases where negative injunctions are inadequate and the parties are 
uncooperative, the court will have no choice but to enter orders of her own creation. “If the trial judge 
cannot issue a negative injunction, and if the parties are unwilling to agree on a remedial plan, the 
judge will have no practical alternative but to exercise his or her own discretion.”  Fletcher, “The 
Discretionary Constitution,” supra note 2 at 655. 
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orders, time frames and checks, institutional reform litigation may be the most 
effective strategy to protect the politically powerless.122 The applicants who typically 
file institutional reform litigation do so because they believe that government 
institutions are unresponsive to their constitutional rights and statutory requirements 
and that judicial action will improve their lives.  Typically, the applicants lack 
economic or political power, and are often invisible to the larger society.123 The 
traditional avenues of government are resistant to them: elected officials can be 
inattentive, uncaring or hostile and government bureaucracies can be callous and 
unresponsive.  Weiner concludes that institutional reform litigation can “play a 
significant role in shaping the actions of government agencies and can promote the 
interests of the politically weak and dependent members of society . . . .”  In this way, 
he claims, these actions can “promote the interests of the weak and despised against 
the many; the desperate against the majority.”124 
Not all government institutions that are found to be constitutionally deficient 
are that way intentionally, however; they may lack adequate resources from the 
legislature and executive to carry out much needed and desired reform.125 In this way, 
 
122 See, e.g., Tremgrove, “Judicial Remedies,” supra note 39. 
 
123 Id. 
124 John Barlow Weiner, “Institutional Reform Consent Decree as Conservers of Social Progress,” 27 
Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 355, 359 (1996). 
 
He also argues that institutional reform litigation, and subsequent consent decrees, can 
 “promote the interests of the socially disadvantaged and politically weak segments of our 
society by imposing specific obligations upon governmental bodies whose legal duties 
previously were unclear.  Not only rights to food and shelter, but due process for prisoners, 
educational opportunities for minority children, welfare assistance for the poor, care for the 
mentally ill, and other rights and benefits enjoyed by the politically weak and dependent can be 
clarified by [institutional reform consent decrees].”  Id. at 362. 
 
125 Even United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan recognized that structural injunction 
orders provide the necessary leverage for cash-strapped government institutions to increase their 
budgets, noting “even prison officials have acknowledged that judicial intervention has helped them to 
obtain support for needed reform.”  Rhodes v. Chapman, supra note 53 at 360. 
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structural injunction orders from the courts can be used to leverage additional 
resources.126 As evidence of this, “it is perhaps the case,” a law-review note posits, 
that state administrators can “rely upon the courts to pressure the legislatures and 
impose needed reforms.”127 In the seminal United States mental health institutional 
reform litigation, Wyatt v. Stickney, for example, the State Superintendent found that 
the court’s orders enabled him to “‘stand up’ to staff members, members of the 
community, and politicians who objected to the actions he took as Superintendent.”128 
Reform-minded administrators can thus use court intervention as a tool to effectively 
implement reforms that they have been unable to convince others to go along with.   
Even in institutional reform cases, courts remain constrained by certain 
hallmarks of judicial decision-making: (1) the judge must make a decision on every 
grievance presented; (2) the judge must listen to witnesses and arguments on both 
sides of every issue; (3) the judge must justify her decision; and (4) appellate review 
ensures that courts do not overstep their authority.129 These safeguards, which are not 
 
126 See, e.g., Diver, ‘The Judge as Political Powerbroker,” supra note 45 at 71 (suggesting that court 
orders give an institution manager “a powerful ally in his unending quest for additional funds”). 
 
Harriman and Strausmann argue that for administrators who wish to make changes but see little hope 
of obtaining the necessary resources from the legislature, judges may appear as “budgetary saviors” 
providing the “one possibility for budgetary growth.”  Linda Harriman and Jeffrey D. Straussman, “Do 
Judges Determine Budget Decisions? Federal Court Decisions in Prison Reform and State Spending for 
Corrections,” 43 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 343, 348-49 (1983). 
 
127 Note, “Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation,” 91 HARV. L. REV. 428, 430 
(1977). 
 
128 Note, “The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change,” 84 
YALE L. J. 1338, 1368 (1975) (quoting the Commissioner of the Alabama Board of Mental Health 
Stonewall Stickney).  See also, Wyatt v. Stickney, supra note 54. 
 
See also, United States v. City of Miami, 2 F.3d 1497, 1507 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[E]perience teaches us 
that on some occasions public employers prefer the supervision of a federal court” to confronting tough 
political decisions). 
 
129 Obviously, appellate review would not be possible if the Constitutional Court were to issue a 
structural injunction order because it is the highest constitutional court in South Africa.  However, just 
as for all other courts, when the Constitutional Court issues a judgment, it, too, must address all issues 
raised and consider all relevant evidence and affidavits filed in the matter.   
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imposed on state legislators and executive officers, who themselves make decisions 
which profoundly affect the welfare of the community, make it more likely that a 
judge’s decision regarding the remedy to be imposed will be reliable and well-
considered. 
Another criticism levied against the use of structural injunction orders is that 
of separation of powers.  Structural injunctions are accused of infringing on the 
separation of powers by excessively concentrating power in the courts at the expense 
of the electoral branches.130 As noted previously, there is a substantial traditional 
precedent for intrusive remedies stemming from institutional litigation which would 
suggest that separation of powers is not an issue.  “To portray the judicial activity in 
structural reform as encroaching on executive and legislative discretion ignores the 
complexity of the relations among the branches [of government] . . .”.131 Sabel and 
Simon convincingly suggest that institutional structural injunction orders provide an 
“accountability-reinforcing” role for the courts, which fits well with familiar notions 
of the separation of powers.132 
Moreover, if the Constitutional Court were to review a high court structural injunction order, as was the 
case in both Grootboom – High Court and Treatment Action Campaign – High Court, appellate review 
would remain available. 
 
Some examples of U.S. Supreme Court appellate review and reversal of institutional litigation where 
the district court issued supervisory jurisdiction, see, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, supra note 66 
(proposing that trial courts limit their remedial discretion); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 
U.S. 424 (1976) (finding that an end-result order was not properly within the power of the district 
court); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (holding that to the extent that remedial issues were 
indeterminate, courts should defer to the defendant). 
 
130 A comprehensive discussion of the separation of powers critique is laid out by Pieterse, “Coming to 
Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights,” supra note 9 at 385-90, 395-411. 
 
131 Sabel and Simon, “Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds,” supra note 30 at 
1091. 
 
132 Id. at 1090-94.  They advance that courts can exercise this “accountability-reinforcing” role if they 
actively work with the state defendant to encourage collaboration of the relief to be ordered, either 
through the submission of reports or a consent decree.  They label this type of structural injunction 
relief to be “experimentalist.” 
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Their thesis that structural injunction orders afford an “accountability-
reinforcing” role for courts, rather than a usurping function, can be persuasively 
applied to the South African model as well.  As seen from the facts of Grootboom and 
Treatment Action Campaign, litigation was brought as a consequence of a failure or 
refusal of government to make any meaningful policy to remedy socio-economic 
rights violations.  The orders of both Grootboom – High Court133 and Treatment 
Action Campaign – High Court134 make clear that structural injunctive relief was 
issued to demand that a state defendant simply promulgate a reasonable policy, within 
an allotted time period.  Because these orders left the government respondent 
significant discretion, separation of powers concerns seem less pressing than had the 
High Court immediately imposed her own structural injunction order. 
Moreover, as Sabel and Simon make clear, this type of collaborative, 
“accountability-reinforcing” court order actually vindicate separation of powers 
concerns, particularly as to accountability since all parties can be involved in drafting 
a consent decree.  These structural injunction orders enhance responsibility “by 
requiring executive officials to make explicit policies and to subject themselves to the 
mechanisms of measurement and monitoring that make their performance more 
readily accessible.”135 This, in turn, makes the executive and agencies more 
accountable to the legislature, the electorate and the courts.136 
133 The full text of the Grootboom – High Court order can be found at note 80.  
 
134 The complete text of the Treatment Action Campaign – High Court order can be found at note 93.  
135 Sabel and Simon, “Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds,” supra note 30 at 
1093. 
 
136 Id. at 1094 (“The new regime [of structural injunction orders allowing discretion to the government 
when possible]  makes clear the goals to which the representatives have committed their constituents 
and makes progress measurable in terms of criteria to which the representatives have agreed.  Where 
progress is not being made, constituents will sometimes be in a position to put pressure on or to replace 
their representatives.”). 
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Perhaps the most serious criticism of judicial issuance of structural injunction 
orders is that of institutional incompetence: that is a single judge, or panel of judges, 
is not equipped, nor should they be, to make important decisions about how a state 
institution should be run.137 Some critics have argued that courts are simply 
functionally incapable of addressing polycentric problems that involve many different 
factors and relationships.138 Other case studies have found that courts experience 
difficulty in weighing policy alternatives and in calculating costs and benefits.139 
While courts are expert at determining fact and causation, structural remedies call 
upon them to engage in markedly different activities.  They must discover and address 
the political, economic and social factors that may have created and exacerbated the 
constitutional violation.  Formulating the correct remedy requires courts to predict 
how the remedy will affect, and be affected by, the political, economic and social 
context within which it is implemented.  Thus, the argument goes, courts are 
structurally worse off than other branches of government at developing an 
intellectually coherent solution to social problems.   
 
137 See Pieterse, “Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights,” supra note 
9 at 396-416. 
 
138 Most famously, see Lon L. Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 
393-404 (1978). 
The theory of polycentricity advances that a complex problem always has a number of subsidiary 
problem “centers,” each of which is related to the others, such that the solution to each depends upon 
the solution to all of the others.  A classic metaphor for a polycentric problem is a spider web, in which 
the tension of the various strands is determined by the relationship among all of the parts of the web, so 
that if one pulls on a single strand, the tension of the entire web is redistributed in a new and complex 
pattern.  Id. at 595.  Fuller argued that polycentric conflicts are ill-suited to resolution by normal 
techniques of adjudication, contending that at some point “managerial” techniques involving intuitive 
and discretionary judgments are necessary.  Id. at 598. 
 
Put differently, Mureinik defined this polycentric problem as a positiveness argument, that “economic 
rights can be delivered in many different ways, and it is always a matter of political and economic 
controversy which is best.”  Mureinik, “Beyond a Charter of Luxuries,” supra note 13 at 468. 
 
139 See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY at 294-97 (1977). 
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This is a serious concern and it is true that judges are not necessarily experts in 
prison administration or school reform.  It is also true that they are no more experts in 
these areas as they are in business arrangements, criminal conspiracies, optimal 
family custodial arrangements or automobile accident reconstruction.  Yet judges are 
often called upon to make legal and factual conclusions with respect to these and 
other topics.140 Remedial orders in institutional litigation are similar to and no more 
complex than the traditional duties of a judge.  In both private law and public 
institutional disputes, the issue of what remedy must be imposed presents unique 
analytical problems, and is always distinct from the finding of liability.141 That a 
dispute involves arguments over how state institutions should be run, rather than a 
private law dispute between two individuals or businesses, is a difference of degree, 
rather than of kind.  What distinguishes institutional reform litigation from other 
forms is only the scale to which it is applied.  .  
Ideally, institutions themselves should be left to correct their own 
unconstitutional practices; but this can only work if they attempt to do so in good 
faith. A court can declare the parameters of a socio-economic right, provide 
benchmarks and deadlines for the government to honor on its constitutional 
obligations and leave the parties with the discretion as to how to assure constitutional 
compliance.  However, the government and applicants agree if that the government 
should meet its responsibilities, the judicial role would remain to ensure that the state 
has acted to meet its obligations.  In this way, soliciting plans from interested parties 
 
140 See Eisenberg and Yeazell, “The Ordinary and Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation,” supra note 
30 at 476-81 (arguing that there is little of importance that differentiates modern institutional decrees 
from the many well-established judicial practices that intrude deeply into the affairs of public and 
private entities).  
 
141 For example, in a contract case, the measure of damages may depend upon factual determinations 
regarding mitigation and whether there were consequential damages.  In certain kinds of tort cases, 
damages can occupy more of the court’s time than the liability phase does.  
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and encouraging agreement among all parties can be enormously useful; it permits 
those directly affected by the litigation to protect their interests from avoidable harm 
and it relieves the court of the need to decide what is best for the parties.  This method 
also enables courts to avoid exercising their discretion to solve polycentric problems 
and puts the burden of the remedial solution back on at least some of those most 
directly affected.   
Unfortunately, this practice of deferring solutions back to the state agent or 
institution may not always work.  The facts of City of Cape Town v Rudolph 
underscore this point.  Not every politician and bureaucrat has a respect for 
constitutional requirements.142 Admittedly, a structural injunction order resulting 
from institutional litigation is a poor alternative to capable and caring performance by 
state officials fulfilling their constitutional duties.  But if state institutions fail to 
measure up to what the constitution or other law demands, and the political branches 
of government take no remedial steps, this may be the only way to bring justice to the 
victims of the state’s continued malfeasance.   
Unless one is prepared to reduce constitutional guarantees to a form of words, 
the proposition that if a constitutional violation is found, it must be remedied cannot 
be questioned.  If the law makes empty promises of justice and courts stand by—
impotently watching constitutional violations persist without taking action to correct 
them—then courts do not fulfil the guarantees of human dignity, equality and 
freedom.   
V. CONCLUSION 
Structural injunction orders have effectively been used in the United States to 
remedy institutional violations of constitutional rights.  They are an attractive way for 
 
142 See, e.g., Governor George Wallace’s blatant defiance of Judge Johnson’s desegregation orders, 
supra note 64.  
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the nascent Constitutional Court and South African judiciary to remedy the wide 
range of socio-economic issues that they are faced with.  South African courts have 
taken unprecedented, progressive steps to recognize socio-economic rights.  Court-
ordered structural injunction orders are one way that those intended rights can be 
realized by all South Africans. 
 
